62. The UK’s future foreign policy depends on its ability to form relationships with a wide group of countries, “in the Commonwealth, in the African Union, in ASEAN and elsewhere”.[1] When the Wagner Network is involved in a country, it becomes harder for the UK to engage there, both diplomatically and militarily.[2] Although working with the Wagner Network is a sovereign decision of national governments, the UK can seek to influence these decisions.
63. UK diplomats have brought up the network’s activities in discussions with national authorities who have engaged with the network.[3] The means by which the UK has sought to dissuade countries from working with the Wagner Network are unclear. Ben Fender (Director, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, FCDO) pointed out that many governments in West Africa are concerned about the Wagner Network’s activities in Mali, noting: “I like to think that our diplomacy and our efforts have contributed” to those concerns[4] - but he did not elaborate on the role of UK diplomacy in informing these countries’ views. The Government has not provided examples of individual countries that it has successfully deterred from choosing to engage with the network.[5] In other words, in its evidence to our inquiry, the Government was unable to provide any direct evidence of having limited or successfully challenged the Wagner Network’s efforts and ambitions in countries where it is invited. The United States is currently working to deter African countries from engaging with the network by sharing intelligence strategically with allies.[6] US officials credited this approach with blunting a planned destabilisation operation in Chad.[7]
64. Another mode of influencing governments’ decisions to engage with the Wagner Network may be to offer a ‘carrot’ in the form of a compelling alternative. The UK’s work with partner states on “nation building and investing in institutions” is
critical to the ability of often fragile states to build their own capacity so that they are not subject to the business model of a Wagner-type group[8]
The Minister highlighted the UK’s work to strengthen institutions in “much of Africa and other regions”; he judged that the UK military and Foreign Office represent a “very successful agent of institutional state building and improving”.[9] Our sister Committee, the International Development Committee, called on the Government in October 2022 to reassess whether a sufficient share of UK aid is reaching communities in fragile and conflict-affected states.[10]
65. In contrast, a ‘stick’ to influence governments’ decisions could be to increase the negative consequences of associating with the network. One such tool would be to
- ↑ The Foreign Secretary also highlighted the opportunity for the UK to be a “reliable, trustworthy and long term partner” via “investments of faith”. UK Government, ‘British foreign policy and diplomacy: Foreign Secretary’s speech, 12 December 2022 (accessed 17 July 2023),
- ↑ Qq221–222 [Leo Docherty]
- ↑ The UK raised concerns directly with the Russian, Libyan and Sudanese authorities. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WGN0025); PQ UIN 59567 [on Sudan: Gold], Answered on 18 October 2022
- ↑ Q108
- ↑ Q108
- ↑ To counter Russia in Africa, Biden deploys a favored strategy, POLITICO, 7 May 2023
- ↑ To counter Russia in Africa, Biden deploys a favored strategy, POLITICO, 7 May 2023
- ↑ Q108 [Leo Docherty]
- ↑ Q110
- ↑ International Development Committee, Third Report of Session 2022–23, From Srebrenica to a safer tomorrow: Preventing future mass atrocities around the world, HC 149, para 9
