to forget what is past, and therefore have given instructions to the Deputy Governor of Bombay to treat with such persons as he shall appoint about the present differences." The Deputy Governor was "very much dissatisfied" with this pacific tone and held that a vigorous policy of aggression against Shiva's country and fleet would "give a speedy conclusion to this dispute,to the Hon'ble Company's advantage." But the higher authorities at Surat only repeated their former orders that Bombay should avoid a war with Shiva and "frustrate his designs
of fortifying Khanderi either by treaty or by the Siddis fleet assisting us to oppose him thereon." The two English captains consulted took the same view. (Ibid.) At the end of December the Marathas dragged several large guns to Thai (on the mainland) and began to fire them at the small English craft lying under Underi
for stress of weather. (Orme MSS. 116.)
But the hope of hindering the Maratha fortification of the island without fighting proved futile, and the English ships were withdrawn (January, 1680) from Khanderi, which, after "holding out [against the Siddis and the English] to the admiration of all," was freed from enemy vessels by the coming of the monsoons, and remained in Shiva's hands. (F. R. Surat 108, Bombay to Surat, 1 Jan. 1680.)
But the Siddi occupied Underi ('Henery'), a small island about a mile in circumference, close to Khanderi, with 300 men and 10 large guns, fortified it (9th January, 1680), and tried to silence the Maratha
