COMMUNE DE PARIS 161 formal proclamation of the commune on the 29th, it was finally suppressed by the troops of the national government two months later, after having in the interval become complicated with attempts to carry out various notions of socialism, and with other schemes of revolution apparently not comprehended in the original design, and certainly not stated as a part of it. The red republicans and the more violent re- formers of Paris had, since the dethronement of Napoleon III. and the proclamation of the republic in September, 1870, never ceased to attack what they considered the conservative character of the government of national defence then established, and to demand more radical measures, especially such as should tend toward decentralization, municipal independence, and the introduction of something approaching a fed- erative system made up of self-governing com- munes. Diligently and sincerely advocated by many of the leading radical politicians, and in- dustriously propagated for their own purposes by political agitators, revolutionists, and ad- venturers in the city, these opinions gained ground very rapidly among the people. They already formed one of the many articles in the political programme of the working men's societies, especially in that of the wide- spread Internationale. By many they were undoubtedly accepted understandingly and with due knowledge of the end to be gained ; but they were largely used as a political device by demagogues and the lowest order of revolu- tionary popular leaders, who represented to the laboring classes the establishment of municipal self-government as the beginning and the means of various more or less vaguely stated reforms in their condition. Thus the cry of " Vive la commune ! " used intelligently by the few, be- came besides, like so many similar cries before it, the expression of the discontent and the somewhat aimless though violent agitation of the revolutionary proletarians. This agitation, though its expressions were generally confined to the radical clubs like that of the Salle Favie at Belleville, that of the Alcazar, and many others had already broken out sev- eral times during the German siege of Paris in riotous demonstrations originating in one of the suburbs Montmartre, Belleville, or La Villette, and having for their object the possession of the hotel de ville. The most important of these was that of the 31st of October, 1870, when the mob, infuriated by the news of the surrender of Metz and the defeat atBourget, fairly gained possession of the place, and even of the mem- bers of the government in session there at the time, but were compelled to withdraw by the national guard, though only on condition that a vote determining the confidence or want of confidence of the people of Paris in the gov- ernment of national defence should immedi- ately be taken. This vote was ordered for Nov. 3, when the government was sustained by overwhelming majorities ; but the radical lead- ers had shown tlmr growing power, and this riot was the most unmistakable herald of the coming insurrection. Finally, when the long series of French defeats and unsuccessful sor- ties terminated in the surrender of the capital to the Germans, and the idea, "The gov- ernment has betrayed us," gradually gained ground among the people, the national guard began to waver, then to join openly in the clamor, until finally, by making the first really formidable insurrectionary movement, they themselves became as it were the leaders in the revolutionary attempt from which they had before comparatively stood aloof. On the triumphal entry of the German army into Paris, March 1, 1871, detachments of the na- tionals, who had by express stipulation been suffered to remain under arms " for the pres- ervation of order," made hostile demonstra- tions in violation of the agreement of the gov- ernment, erecting barricades in several por- tions of the city, and remaining in an attitude of resistance ; and they placed themselves in still more decided opposition to the authori- ties by their refusal, in spite of the formal order of Gen. Aurelle de Paladines, the commandant, to give up the artillery which had been re- moved on Feb. 26 from the pare Wagram and other places, ostensibly to preserve it from fall- ing into the hands of the Germans. Thus ta- ken into their possession under cover of a pur- pose which, though in direct violation of the armistice agreement, passed for a patriotic one, this artillery proved one of the chief sources of their strength in the beginning of the insur- rection. The government did not at first at- tribute to this direct resistance to its author- ity the importance which it possessed ; and in the interval of temporizing policy which fol- lowed, the insurrection grew stronger with great rapidity. The first step taken, the com- mune leaders won adherents by thousands. The negotiations of the authorities with the Germans aided them ; for not only was there a great number of the people to whom the thought of peace on the apparently inevitable terms was, from purely national pride and patriotic feeling, almost unbearable, but there was also a perhaps still larger class, com- posing the worse portion of the national guard especially, which saw in the end of the war the end also of their living at government ex- pense, and looked forward to the return of hard labor, the enforcement of creditors' claims, the collection of rents, and a thousand evils they had evaded during the war. Both these class- es, and many more, flocked eagerly to the standard of the commune, whose leaders raised the cry, " The republic is in danger ! " and in a few days the insurrection became too formi- dable to be checked. An organized body now appeared as its head. This was the central committee of the national guard, a council of leading insurgents, at first under the controlling influence of Blanqui, which had long acted as a half-concealed conspiracy, but now came for- ward openly. Its power was for a time threat-
