do not ſuppoſe and imply, either general abſtract Ideas or abſolute external Extenſion to be the Object of Geometry? And, therefore, whether, along with thoſe Suppoſitions, ſuch Arguments alſo do not ceaſe and vaniſh?
Qu. 21. Whether the ſuppoſed infinite Diviſibility of finite Extenſion hath not been a Snare to Mathematicians, and a Thorn in their Sides? And whether a Quantity infinitely diminiſhed and a Quantity infinitely ſmall are not the ſame thing?
Qu. 22. Whether it be neceſſary to conſider Velocities of naſcent or evaneſcent Quantities, or Moments, or Infiniteſimals? And whether the introducing of Things ſo inconceivable be not a reproach to Mathematics?
Qu. 23. Whether Inconſiſtencies can be Truths? Whether Points repugnant and abſurd are to be admitted upon any Subject, or in any Science? And whether the uſe of Infinites ought to be allowed, as a
