Qu. 33. Whether it would not be righter to approximate fairly, than to endeavour at Accuracy by Sophiſms?
Qu. 34. Whether it would not be more decent to proceed by Trials and Inductions, than to pretend to demonſtrate by falſe Principles?
Qu. 35. Whether there be not a way of arriving at Truth, although the Principles are not ſcientific, nor the Reaſoning juſt? And whether ſuch a way ought to be called a Knack or a Science?
Qu. 36. Whether there can be Science of the Concluſion, where there is not Science of the Principles? And whether a Man can have Science of the Principles, without underſtanding them? And therefore whether the Mathematicians of the preſent Age act like Men of Science, in taking ſo much more pains to apply their Principles, than to underſtand them?
