but it was in truth exhaustively examined and completely answered in that Report. In paragraph 92 the Report examines seriatim the principal apprehensions expressed for the safety of the tunnel. "These are to the effect that it might pass into the hands of an enemy—
"(1) By surprise, effected through the tunnel itself;
"(2) By surprise, effected by a force landed in the neighborhood of the tunnel, with or without the aid of troops passed through the tunnel;
"(3) By surprise, facilitated by treachery;
"(4) After investment by an invading force;
"(5) By cession as the condition of a disastrous peace."
All these apprehensions are really expressions of fear of hostility from France. If anyone of these apprehensions had carried weight with Italy, Germany, or France, the St. Gothard Tunnel, or the Mont Cenis Tunnel would never have been made. The three suppositions, 1, 2, and 3, are possible in case of an attempt made by Frenchmen when France and England are both at peace, and indeed this is Lord Wolseley's contention. "The seizing of the tunnel by a coup de main is, in my opinion," says his lordship, "a very simple operation, provided it be done without any previous warning or intimation whatever by those who wish to invade the country." "My contention is, that were a tunnel made, England, as a nation, could be destroyed without any warning whatever, when Europe was in a condition of profound peace. … the whole plan is based upon the assumption of its being carried out during a time of profound peace between the two nations, and whilst we were enjoying life in the security and unsuspicion of a fool's paradise."
My short answer to this wild contention is that all
