Meno.
Socrates, Meno.
is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it. But when they are bound, in the first place, they have the nature of knowledge; and, in the second place, they are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more honourable and excellent than true opinion, because fastened by a chain.
Men. What you are saying, Socrates, seems to be very like the truth.
Soc. I too speak rather in ignorance; I only conjecture. And yet that knowledge differs from true opinion is no matter of conjecture with me. There are not many things which I profess to know, but this is most certainly one of them.
Men. Yes, Socrates; and you are quite right in saying so.
Soc. And am I not also right in saying that true opinion leading the way perfects action quite as well as knowledge?
Men. There again, Socrates, I think that you are right.
Soc. Then right opinion is not a whit inferior to knowledge, or less useful in action; nor is the man who has right opinion inferior to him who has knowledge?
Men. True.
Soc. And surely the good man has been acknowledged by us to be useful?
Men. Yes.
Soc. Seeing then that men become good and useful to states, not only because they have knowledge, but because they have right opinion, and that neither knowledge nor right opinion is given to man by nature or acquired by him—(do you imagine either of them to be given by nature?
Men. Not I.)
Soc. Then if they are not given by nature, neither are the good by nature good?
Men. Certainly not.
Soc. And nature being excluded, then came the question whether virtue is acquired by teaching?
Men. Yes.
Soc. If virtue was wisdom [or knowledge], then, as we thought, it was taught?
Men. Yes.
Soc. And if it was taught it was wisdom?
Men. Certainly.
