Meno.
Socrates, Meno.
Soc. And if there were teachers, it might be taught; and if there were no teachers, not?
Men. True.
Soc. But surely we acknowledged that there were no teachers of virtue?
Men. Yes.
Soc. Then we acknowledged that it was not taught, and was not wisdom?
Men. Certainly.
Soc. And yet we admitted that it was a good?
Men. Yes.
Soc. And the right guide is useful and good?99
Men. Certainly.
If virtue and knowledge cannot be taught, the only right guides of men are true opinions. Soc. And the only right guides are knowledge and true opinion—these are the guides of man; for things which happen by chance are not under the guidance of man: but the guides of man are true opinion and knowledge.
Men. I think so too.
Soc. But if virtue is not taught, neither is virtue knowledge.
Men. Clearly not.
Soc. Then of two good and useful things, one, which is knowledge, has been set aside, and cannot be supposed to be our guide in political life.
Men. I think not.
Soc. And therefore not by any wisdom, and not because they were wise, did Themistocles and those others of whom Anytus spoke govern states. This was the reason why they were unable to make others like themselves—because their virtue was not grounded on knowledge.
Men. That is probably true, Socrates.
Right opinion is in politics what divination is in religion; diviners, prophets, poets, statesmen, may all be truly called 'divine men.' Soc. But if not by knowledge, the only alternative which remains is that statesmen must have guided states by right opinion, which is in politics what divination is in religion; for diviners and also prophets say many things truly, but they know not what they say.
Men. So I believe.
Soc. And may we not, Meno, truly call those men 'divine' who, having no understanding, yet succeed in many a grand deed and word?
Men. Certainly.
