proved unfounded. The Gurkhás of the Nasírí battalion were quickly satisfied, returned to their duty, and marched gaily for Philáur.
Meanwhile, at Ambálah, General Anson began to realise every day more keenly that the means at his hand for the recapture of a strong fortress, garrisoned by a superior number of disciplined troops, were very insufficient. Not only were his European troops few in numbers, but the several war departments — the Commissariat, the Medical, the Transport, the Ordnance, and Ammunition — taken by surprise, were unprepared for a prompt movement. On the 18th of May the men had no tents, but twenty rounds apiece of ammunition, no artillery reserve ammunition, no transport.[1] Under these circumstances. General Anson doubted whether it would be prudent with his small means to risk an attack on Dehlí. He wrote in this sense to Sir John Lawrence, expressing not only his own opinion but that of the chief officers of his staff. The Commissary-General, he added, declared his inability to provide the wherewithal for such a march under from sixteen to twenty days. These views, backed as they were by the highest military authorities on the spot, found no acceptance either with Sir John Lawrence, with Lord Canning, or with the self-constituted critics in other parts of India. The idea widely prevailed that, because Delhí had never, in the history of India, offered a serious resistance to an armed force, it would not and could not do so now. There was absolutely no reason for this argument beyond that suggested by the notion that that which had happened before must always happen again. There was, I have already mentioned, a very indistinct idea in military circles as to the defensive power of the Imperial city. Everyone knew that it was encompassed
- ↑ Letter from General Barnard, dated Ambálah, May 18, 1857.
