Page:The Indian Mutiny of 1857.djvu/144

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118
Should Dehlí be attacked?

by walls. But, it was argued, with the superficiality which was one of the signs of the times, that siege-guns were cast in order that they might batter down walls. The man would have been laughed at who should have asserted that Dehlí was as strong as Bhartpur had been. It was expected, alike in Calcutta and in the Panjáb, that General Anson had but to appear with his British force before Dehlí to induce the rebels to surrender the city.[1] I write with the most absolute certainty when I state that this was the main reason which incited alike Lord Canning and Sir John Lawrence to urge the advance with a force they knew to be insufficient for a great enterprise. I am confident that if the givers of that advice had realised the strength of Dehlí, and its splendid capabilities of resistance, they would have urged the advance, if they had urged it at all, in language betokening far less confidence. Undoubtedly they felt, and felt most keenly, the enormous issues at stake. Sir John Lawrence did not attempt to conceal his conviction that the maintenance of order in the Punjáb depended on the prompt reduction of Dehlí. Lord Canning knew that the safety of the long and weak middle piece between Allahábád and Mírath would be enormously affected by the retention by the rebels of a place possessing such a history and such prestige. Yet, keenly anxious as they were to strike the decisive blow at the decisive point, I doubt much whether they would have employed the language, almost of remonstrance, which characterised their letters to General Anson if they had imbibed anything like a correct idea of his difficulties, and of the still greater resistance which was awaiting his troops at their destination.

  1. Sir John Lawrence wrote (May 21): 'My belief is that, with good management on the part of the civil officers, it' (Dehlí) 'would open its gates on the approach of our troops.'