Page:The New Europe (The Slav standpoint), 1918.pdf/72

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64

Quite numerous is a class of historians (principally Marxists) who pretend to be deep thinkers when they claim that in explaining the war one should not look at the causes lying on the surface, but to remote causes, the underlying, real, driving force. It is true that no thinking man is satisfied with secondary causes, with the last causes in point of time, yet not the decisive ones; everyone knows that scratching the match that fired the prepared powder was not the true cause and the decisive motive of the act; but on the other hand we will not be misled by that seeming wisdom, which by means of psychological “hocus pocus” such as “the driving force of driving forces,” reveals in fine only economic or similar interests.

A somewhat more modest philosophy of history is preached by those who point to the difficulty of giving a scientific explanation of the war; because of the excessive complication of this question it is not possible to determine the true cause of the war, and historians will not be able to decide that for a hundred years. Certainly the exact statement of all single facts is impossible, certain causes remain unknown, secret archives will reveal in the future many interesting details, but enough is known; on the contrary, such an event as the present world-war can be sufficiently explained by the entire development and state of Europe. To-day it is already determined with considerable accuracy that Austria and Germany are guilty of the war.

Among the various explanations of this war we find presumably that ultra-scientific positivism minimising and reducing the moral responsibility of individuals for the war; it accepts historical fatalism as determined by laws in the spirit of passive fatalism and it conceals under the guise of philosophy and history moral indifference and irresolution. Against this unnatural passivism and moral dilletantism, which in real life cringes before success, we join those to whom history is the judge of the world, of individuals and of nations, and who under the weight of world happenings do not lose their faith in moral responsibility and in the duty to help with increased energy in the fight for freedom of nations and humanity.

54b. The analysis of facts makes clear the guilt of Austria and Germany beyond all doubt; to-day it is already possible to refer to an extensive literature on this question[1]; it is of some importance that in Germany voices are increasing that admit the guilt of Germany and Austria. The author of “J’Accuse” has now among the socialists a number of followers: Bernstein declared that he looks upon his vote for the first military credit, now that he realised the true state of things, as the most unfortunate act of his whole life. The report of Lichnowsky, the journal of Mihlon and other documents, leave no doubt of the guilt of Austria and Prussia; the socialist minority is now strengthened by non-socialist voices in Austria and Germany, that do not accept any longer, or at least doubt strongly, the official explanation of Berlin and Vienna, that the war is defensive. The language of facts is but too clear; Serbia in answer to Austria’s ultimatum conceded all that might be demanded of a sovereign state, and Russia placed no obstacles to it; England proposed a conference, and there is no reason why the proposal should not have been accepted—the crowned drones of the Central Powers have usually plenty of time for all kinds of solemn stupidities, why did not William, Francis Joseph and Nicholas meet with their chancellors for an oral conference before making such a far-reaching decision?

The spread of Pangermanism in accordance with which the war is not merely carried on, but which was being prepared for years and years, is sufficient proof that Germany and Austria wanted the war, for the Allied Powers were not prepared. The Russian Bolsheviks are siding strongly with the Germans, and yet Zinovjev in his pamphlet considers the German and Austrian preparedness as the strongest argument raised against Germany; the more decent Germans themselves admit the strength of this


  1. In The New Europe, 30 November 1916, I wrote a lengthy article on the then existing state of affairs.