The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
- The decision to deploy a large scale force for potential combat operations was taken without collective Ministerial consideration of the decision and its implications.
- The large scale force deployed was a one‑shot capability. It would have been difficult to sustain the force if combat operations had been delayed until autumn 2003 or longer, and it constrained the capabilities which were available for a UK military contribution to post‑conflict operations.
Military equipment (pre‑conflict)
813. The following key findings are from Section 6.3:
- The decisions taken between mid‑December 2002 and mid‑January 2003 to increase combat forces and bring forward the date on which UK forces might participate in combat operations compressed the timescales available for preparation.
- The achievements made in preparing the forces in the time available were very considerable, but the deployment of forces more quickly than anticipated in the Defence Planning Assumptions meant that there were some serious equipment shortfalls when conflict began.
- Those shortfalls were exacerbated by the lack of an effective asset tracking system, a lesson from previous operations and exercises that the MOD had identified but not adequately addressed.
- Ministers were not fully aware of the risks inherent in the decisions and the MOD and PJHQ were not fully aware of the situation on the ground during the conflict.
Planning for a post‑Saddam Hussein Iraq
814. The following key findings are from Section 6.4, and relate to evidence in Sections 6.4 and 6.5:
- Before the invasion of Iraq, Ministers, senior officials and the UK military recognised that post‑conflict civilian and military operations were likely to be the strategically decisive phase of the Coalition’s engagement in Iraq.
- UK planning and preparation for the post‑conflict phase of operations, which rested on the assumption that the UK would be able quickly to reduce its military presence in Iraq and deploy only a minimal number of civilians, were wholly inadequate.
- The information available to the Government before the invasion provided a clear indication of the potential scale of the post‑conflict task and the significant risks associated with the UK’s proposed approach.
- Foreseeable risks included post‑conflict political disintegration and extremist violence in Iraq, the inadequacy of US plans, the UK’s inability to exert significant influence on US planning and, in the absence of UN authorisation
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