Executive Summary
for the administration and reconstruction of post‑conflict Iraq, the reluctance of potential international partners to contribute to the post‑conflict effort.
- The Government, which lacked both clear Ministerial oversight of post‑conflict strategy, planning and preparation, and effective co‑ordination between government departments, failed to analyse or manage those risks adequately.
- Mr Blair, who recognised the significance of the post‑conflict phase, did not press President Bush for definite assurances about US plans, did not consider or seek advice on whether the absence of a satisfactory plan called for reassessment of the terms of the UK’s engagement and did not make agreement on such a plan a condition of UK participation in military action.
The invasion
815. The following key findings are from Section 8:
- It took less than a month to achieve the departure of Saddam Hussein and the fall of Baghdad.
- The decision to advance into Basra was made by military commanders on the ground.
- The UK was unprepared for the media response to the initial difficulties. It had also underestimated the need for sustained communication of key strategic messages to inform public opinion about the objectives and progress of the military campaign, including in Iraq.
- For any future military operations, arrangements to agree and disseminate key strategic messages need to be put in place, in both London and on the ground, before operations begin.
- The UK acceded to the post‑invasion US request that it assume leadership of a military Area of Responsibility (AOR) encompassing four provinces in southern Iraq, a position it then held for six years, without a formal Ministerial decision and without carrying out a robust analysis of the strategic implications for the UK or the military’s capacity to support the UK’s potential obligations in the region.
The post‑conflict period
816. The following key findings are from Section 9.8, and relate to evidence in Sections 9.1 to 9.7:
- Between 2003 and 2009, the UK’s most consistent strategic objective in relation to Iraq was to reduce the level of its deployed forces.
- The UK struggled from the start to have a decisive effect on the Coalition Provisional Authority’s (CPA’s) policies, even though it was fully implicated in its decisions as joint Occupying Power.
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