Page:The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary.pdf/128

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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

  • US and UK strategies for Iraq began to diverge almost immediately after the conflict. Although the differences were managed, by early 2007 the UK was finding it difficult to play down the divergence, which was, by that point, striking.
  • The UK missed clear opportunities to reconsider its military approach in Multi‑National Division (South‑East).
  • Throughout 2004 and 2005, it appears that senior members of the Armed Forces reached the view that little more would be achieved in MND(SE) and that it would make more sense to concentrate military effort on Afghanistan where it might have greater effect.
  • From July 2005 onwards, decisions in relation to resources for Iraq were made under the influence of the demands of the UK effort in Afghanistan. Although Iraq remained the stated UK main effort, the Government no longer had the option of a substantial reinforcement of its forces there.
  • The UK’s plans to reduce troop levels depended on the transition of lead responsibility for security to the Iraqi Security Forces, even as the latter’s ability to take on that responsibility was in question.
  • The UK spent time and energy on rewriting strategies, which tended to describe a desired end state without setting out how it would be reached.
  • UK forces withdrew from Iraq in 2009 in circumstances which did not meet objectives defined in January 2003.

Reconstruction

817.  The following key findings are from Section 10.4, and relate to evidence in Sections 10.1 to 10.3:

  • The UK failed to plan or prepare for the major reconstruction programme required in Iraq.
  • Reconstruction was the third pillar in a succession of UK strategies for Iraq. The Government never resolved how reconstruction would support broader UK objectives.
  • Following the resignation of Ms Clare Short, the International Development Secretary, and the adoption of UN Security Council resolution 1483 in May 2003, DFID assumed leadership of the UK’s reconstruction effort in Iraq. DFID would subsequently define, within the framework established by the Government, the scope and nature of that effort.
  • At key points, DFID should have considered strategic questions about the scale, focus and purpose of the UK’s reconstruction effort in Iraq.
  • The US‑led Coalition Provisional Authority excluded the UK from discussions on oil policy and on disbursements from the Development Fund for Iraq.
  • Many of the failures which affected pre‑invasion planning and preparation persisted throughout the post‑conflict period. They included poor
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