not then directly making the assessment upon it. That is one of the very important strengths of our system compared with most other systems around the world.”[1]
847. The FAC endorsed those sentiments.[2] It stated that the JIC has a “vital role in safeguarding the independence and impartiality of intelligence”; and that the “independence and impartiality of its own role” was “of the utmost importance”. It recommended that Ministers should “bear in mind at all times the importance of ensuring that the JIC is free of all political pressure”.
848. In its response to the FAC, the Government stated:
“We agree. The JIC plays a crucial role in providing the Government with objective assessments on a range of issues of importance to national interests.”[3]
The invasion of Iraq
849. The military plan for the invasion of Iraq depended for success on a rapid advance on Baghdad, including convincing the Iraqi population of the Coalition’s determination to remove the regime.
850. By the end of March, the Government had recognised the need for sustained communication of key strategic messages and improved capabilities to reach a range of audiences in the UK, Iraq and the wider international community. But there was clearly a need for more robust arrangements to integrate Coalition efforts in the UK, US and the forces deployed in Iraq.
851. The reaction of the media and the Iraqi population to perceived difficulties encountered within days of the start of an operation, which was planned to last up to 125 days, might have been anticipated if there had been more rigorous examination of possible scenarios pre‑conflict and the media had better understood the original concept of operations and the nature of the Coalition responses to the situations they encountered once the campaign began.
852. The difficulty and complexity of successfully delivering distinct strategic messages to each of the audiences a government needs to reach should not be underestimated. For any future military operations, arrangements tailored to meet the circumstances of each operation need to be put in place in both London and on the ground before operations begin.
- ↑ Ninth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2002‑2003, 7 July 2003, The Decision to go to War in Iraq, HC 813‑1, paragraph 153.
- ↑ Ninth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2002‑2003, 7 July 2003, The Decision to go to War in Iraq, HC 813‑1, paragraphs 156‑157.
- ↑ Foreign Secretary, November 2003, The Decision to go to War in Iraq Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, November 2003, Cm6062, paragraph 27.
