The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
853. When the UK acceded to the US request that it assume leadership of a military
Area of Responsibility encompassing four provinces in southern Iraq, it did so without a
robust analysis either of the strategic implications for the UK or of the military’s capacity
to support the UK’s potential obligations in the region.
854. A step of such magnitude should be taken deliberately and having considered the wider strategic and resource implications and contingent liabilities.
855. That requires all government departments whose responsibilities will be engaged to have been formally involved in providing Ministers with coherent inter‑departmental advice before decisions are taken; the proper function of the Cabinet Committee system.
The post‑conflict period
856. The UK had not participated in an opposed invasion and full‑scale occupation of a sovereign State (followed by shared responsibility for security and reconstruction over a long period) since the end of the Second World War. The particular circumstances of Op TELIC are unlikely to recur. Nevertheless, there are lessons to be drawn about major operations abroad and the UK’s approach to armed intervention.
857. The UK did not achieve its objectives, despite the best efforts and acceptance of risk in a dangerous environment by military and civilian personnel.
858. Although the UK expected to be involved in Iraq for a lengthy period after the conflict, the Government was unprepared for the role in which the UK found itself from April 2003. Much of what went wrong stemmed from that lack of preparation.
859. In any undertaking of this kind, certain fundamental elements are of vital importance:
- the best possible appreciation of the theatre of operations, including the political, cultural and ethnic background, and the state of society, the economy and infrastructure;
- a hard‑headed assessment of risks;
- objectives which are realistic within that context, and if necessary limited – rather than idealistic and based on optimistic assumptions; and
- allocation of the resources necessary for the task – both military and civil.
860. All of these elements were lacking in the UK’s approach to its role in post‑conflict Iraq.
861. Where responsibility is to be shared, it is essential to have written agreement in advance on how decision‑making and governance will operate within an alliance or coalition. The UK normally acts with allies, as it did in Iraq. Within the NATO Alliance, the rules and mechanisms for decision‑taking and the sharing of responsibility have been developed over time and are well understood. The Coalition in Iraq, by contrast,
