71. The discussion in Cabinet was couched in terms of Iraq’s need to comply with its obligations, and future choices by the international community on how to respond to the threat which Iraq represented.
72. Cabinet endorsed the conclusion that Iraq’s WMD programmes posed a threat to peace, and endorsed a strategy of engaging closely with the US Government in order to shape policy and its presentation. It did not discuss how that might be achieved.
73. Mr Blair sought and was given information on a range of issues before his meeting with President Bush at Crawford on 5 and 6 April. But no formal and agreed analysis of the issues and options was sought or produced, and there was no collective consideration of such advice.
74. Mr Straw’s advice of 25 March proposed that the US and UK should seek an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to re-admit weapons inspectors.[1] That would provide a route for the UK to align itself with the US without adopting the US objective of regime change. This reflected advice that regime change would be unlawful.
75. At Crawford, Mr Blair offered President Bush a partnership in dealing urgently with the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. He proposed that the UK and the US should pursue a strategy based on an ultimatum calling on Iraq to permit the return of weapons inspectors or face the consequences.[2]
76. President Bush agreed to consider the idea but there was no decision until September 2002.
77. In the subsequent press conference on 6 April, Mr Blair stated that "doing nothing" was not an option: the threat of WMD was real and had to be dealt with.[3] The lesson of 11 September was to ensure that "groups" were not allowed to develop a capability they might use.
78. In his memoir, Mr Blair characterised the message that he and President Bush had delivered to Saddam Hussein as "change the regime attitude on WMD inspections or face the prospect of changing regime".[4]
79. Documents written between April and July 2002 reported that, in the discussion with President Bush at Crawford, Mr Blair had set out a number of considerations in relation to the development of policy on Iraq. These were variously described as:
- The UN inspectors needed to be given every chance of success.
- The US should take action within a multilateral framework with international support, not unilateral action.
- ↑ Minute Straw to Prime Minister, 25 March 2002, 'Crawford/Iraq'.
- ↑ Letter Manning to McDonald, 8 April 2002, 'Prime Minister's Visit to the United States: 5–7 April'.
- ↑ The White House, 6 April 2002, President Bush, Prime Minister Blair Hold Press Conference.
- ↑ Blair T. A Journey. Hutchinson, 2010.
