Page:The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary.pdf/18

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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
  • A public information campaign should be mounted to explain the nature of Saddam Hussein's regime and the threat he posed.
  • Any military action would need to be within the framework of international law.
  • The military strategy would need to ensure Saddam Hussein could be removed quickly and successfully.
  • A convincing "blueprint" was needed for a post‑Saddam Hussein Iraq which would be acceptable to both Iraq's population and its neighbours.
  • The US should advance the Middle East Peace Process in order to improve the chances of gaining broad support in the Middle East for military action against Iraq; and to pre‑empt accusations of double standards.
  • Action should enhance rather than diminish regional stability.
  • Success would be needed in Afghanistan to demonstrate the benefits of regime change.

80. Mr Blair considered that he was seeking to influence US policy by describing the key elements for a successful strategy to secure international support for any military action against Iraq.

81. Key Ministers and some of their most senior advisers thought these were the conditions that would need to be met if the UK was to participate in US‑led military action.

82. By July, no progress had been made on the ultimatum strategy and Iraq was still refusing to admit weapons inspectors as required by resolution 1284 (1999).

83. The UK Government was concerned that the US Administration was contemplating military action in circumstances where it would be very difficult for the UK to participate in or, conceivably, to support that action.

84. To provide the basis for a discussion with the US, a Cabinet Office paper of 19 July, 'Iraq: Conditions for Military Action', identified the conditions which would be necessary before military action would be justified and the UK could participate in such action.[1]

85. The Cabinet Office paper stated that Mr Blair had said at Crawford:

"... that the UK would support military action to bring about regime change, provided that certain conditions were met:

  • efforts had been made to construct a coalition/shape public opinion,
  • the Israel‑Palestine Crisis was quiescent, and
  • the options for action to eliminate Iraq's WMD through the UN weapons inspectors had been exhausted."

  1. Paper Cabinet Office, 19 July 2002, 'Iraq: Conditions for Military Action'.
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