"The military part of this is hazardous but I will concentrate mainly on the political context for success.”
95. Mr Blair stated that getting rid of Saddam Hussein was:
"... the right thing to do. He is a potential threat. He could be contained.
But containment ... is always risky. His departure would free up the region.
And his regime is ... brutal and inhumane ...”
96. Mr Blair told President Bush that the UN was the simplest way to encapsulate a “casus belli” in some defining way, with an ultimatum to Iraq once military forces started to build up in October. That might be backed by a UN resolution.
97. Mr Blair thought it unlikely that Saddam Hussein intended to allow inspectors to return. If he did, the JIC had advised that Iraq would obstruct the work of the inspectors. That could result in a material breach of the obligations imposed by the UN.
98. A workable military plan to ensure the collapse of the regime would be required.
99. The Note reflected Mr Blair’s own views. The proposals had not been discussed or agreed with his colleagues.
Decision to take the UN route
100. Sir David Manning, Mr Blair’s Foreign Policy Adviser, told President Bush that it would be impossible for the UK to take part in any action against Iraq unless it went through the UN.
101. When Mr Blair spoke to President Bush on 31 July the "central issue of a casus belli" and the need for further work on the optimal route to achieve that was discussed.[1] Mr Blair said that he wanted to explore whether the UN was the right route to set an ultimatum or whether it would be an obstacle.
102. In late August, the FCO proposed a strategy of coercion, using a UN resolution to issue an ultimatum to Iraq to admit the weapons inspectors and disarm. The UK was seeking a commitment from the Security Council to take action in the event that Saddam Hussein refused or subsequently obstructed the inspectors.
103. Reflecting the level of public debate and concern, Mr Blair decided in early September that an explanation of why action was needed to deal with Iraq should be published.
- ↑ Rycroft to McDonald, 31 July 2002, 'Iraq: Prime Minister's Phone Call with President Bush, 31 July'.
