104. In his press conference at Sedgefield on 3 September, Mr Blair indicated that time and patience were running out and that there were difficulties with the existing policy of containment.[1] He also announced the publication of the Iraq dossier, stating that:
"... people will see that there is no doubt at all the United Nations resolutions that Saddam is in breach of are there for a purpose. He [Saddam Hussein] is without any question, still trying to develop that chemical, biological, potentially nuclear capability and to allow him to do so without any let or hindrance, just to say, we [sic] can carry on and do it, I think would be irresponsible."
105. President Bush decided in the meeting of the National Security Council on 7 September to take the issue of Iraq back to the UN.
106. The UK was a key ally whose support was highly desirable for the US. The US Administration had been left in no doubt that the UK Government needed the issue of Iraq to be taken back to the Security Council before it would be able to participate in military action in Iraq.
107. The objective of the subsequent discussions between President Bush and Mr Blair at Camp David was, as Mr Blair stated in the press conference before the discussions, to work out the strategy.[2]
108. Mr Blair told President Bush that he was in no doubt about the need to deal with Saddam Hussein.[3]
109. Although at that stage no decision had been taken on which military package might be offered to the US for planning purposes, Mr Blair also told President Bush that, if it came to war, the UK would take a significant military role.
110. In his speech to the General Assembly on 12 September, President Bush set out his view of the "grave and gathering danger" posed by Saddam Hussein and challenged the UN to act to address Iraq's failure to meet the obligations imposed by the Security Council since 1990.[4] He made clear that, if Iraq defied the UN, the world must hold Iraq to account and the US would "work with the UN Security Council for the necessary resolutions". But the US would not stand by and do nothing in the face of the threat.
111. Statements made by China, France and Russia in the General Assembly debate after President Bush's speech highlighted the different positions of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council, in particular about the role of the Council in deciding whether military action was justified.
- ↑ The National Archives, 3 September 2002, PM press conference [at Sedgefield].
- ↑ The White House, 7 September 2002, President Bush, Prime Minister Blair Discuss Keeping the Peace.
- ↑ Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 8 September 2002, 'Your Visit to Camp David on 7 September: Conversation with President Bush'.
- ↑ The White House, 12 September 2002, President's Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly.
