112. The Government dossier on Iraq was published on 24 September.[1] It was designed to "make the case" and secure Parliamentary (and public) support for the Government's policy that action was urgently required to secure Iraq's disarmament.
113. In his statement to Parliament on 24 September and in his answers to subsequent questions, Mr Blair presented Iraq's past, current and potential future capabilities as evidence of the severity of the potential threat from Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. He said that at some point in the future that threat would become a reality.[2]
114. Mr Blair wrote his statement to the House of Commons himself and chose the arguments to make clear his perception of the threat and why he believed that there was an "overwhelming" case for action to disarm Iraq.
115. Addressing the question of why Saddam Hussein had decided in mid‑September, but not before, to admit the weapons inspectors, Mr Blair stated that the answer was in the dossier, and it was because:
"... his chemical, biological and nuclear programme is not an historic left‑over from 1998. The inspectors are not needed to clean up the old remains. His weapons of mass destruction programme is active detailed and growing. The policy of containment is not working. The weapons of mass destruction programme is not shut down; it is up and running now."
116. Mr Blair posed, and addressed, three questions: "Why Saddam?"; "Why now?"; and "Why should Britain care?"
117. On the question "Why Saddam?", Mr Blair said that two things about Saddam Hussein stood out: "He had used these weapons in Iraq" and thousands had died, and he had used them during the war with Iran "in which one million people died"; and the regime had "no moderate elements to appeal to".
118. On the question "Why now?", Mr Blair stated:
"I agree I cannot say that this month or next, even this year or next, Saddam will use his weapons. But I can say that if the international community, having made the call for his disarmament, now, at this moment, at the point of decision, shrugs its shoulders and walks away, he will draw the conclusion dictators faced with a weakening will always draw: that the international community will talk but not act, will use diplomacy but not force. We know, again from our history, that diplomacy not backed by the threat of force has never worked with dictators and never will."
