Page:The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary.pdf/24

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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

127. Mr Blair decided on 31 October to offer significant forces for ground operations to the US for planning purposes.[1]

128. During the negotiations, France and Russia made clear their opposition to the use of force, without firm evidence of a further material breach and a further decision in the Security Council.

129. The UK was successful in changing some aspects of the US position during the negotiations, in particular ensuring that the Security Council resolution was based on the disarmament of Iraq rather than wider issues as originally proposed by the US.

130. To secure consensus in the Security Council despite the different positions of the US and France and Russia (described by Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the UK Permanent Representative to the UN in New York, as "irreconcilable"), resolution 1441 was a compromise containing drafting "fixes". That created deliberate ambiguities on a number of key issues including:

  • the level of non‑compliance with resolution 1441 which would constitute a material breach;
  • by whom that determination would be made; and
  • whether there would be a second resolution explicitly authorising the use of force.

131. As the Explanations of Vote demonstrated, there were significant differences between the positions of the members of the Security Council about the circumstances and timing of recourse to military action. There were also differences about whether Member States should be entitled to report Iraqi non‑compliance to the Council.

132. Mr Blair, Mr Straw and other senior UK participants in the negotiation of resolution 1441 envisaged that, in the event of a material breach of Iraq's obligations, a second resolution determining that a breach existed and authorising the use of force was likely to be tabled in the Security Council.

133. Iraq announced on 13 November that it would comply with resolution 1441.[2]

134. Iraq also restated its position that it had neither produced nor was in possession of weapons of mass destruction since the inspectors left in December 1998. It explicitly challenged the UK statement on 8 November that Iraq had "decided to keep possession" of its WMD.


  1. Letter Wechsberg to Watkins, 31 October 2002, 'Iraq: Military Options'.
  2. UN Security Council, 13 November 2002, 'Letter dated 13 November 2002 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General' (S/2002/1242).
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