The prospect of military action
135. Following Iraq's submission of the declaration on its chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes to the UN on 7 December, and before the inspectors had properly begun their task, the US concluded that Saddam Hussein was not going to take the final opportunity offered by resolution 1441 to comply with his obligations.
136. Mr Blair was advised on 11 December that there was impatience in the US Administration and it was looking at military action as early as mid‑February 2003.[1]
137. Mr Blair told President Bush on 16 December that the Iraqi declaration was "patently false".[2] He was "cautiously optimistic" that the inspectors would find proof.
138. In a statement issued on 18 December, Mr Straw said that Saddam Hussein had decided to continue the pretence that Iraq had no WMD programme. If he persisted "in this obvious falsehood" it would become clear that he had "rejected the pathway to peace".[3]
139. The JIC's initial Assessment of the Iraqi declaration on 18 December stated that there had been "No serious attempt" to answer any of the unresolved questions highlighted by the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) or to refute any of the points made in the UK dossier on Iraq's WMD programme.[4]
140. President Bush is reported to have told a meeting of the US National Security Council on 18 December 2002, at which the US response to Iraq's declaration was discussed, that the point of the 7 December declaration was to test whether Saddam Hussein would accept the "final opportunity" for peace offered by the Security Council.[5] He had summed up the discussion by stating:
"We've got what we need now, to show America that Saddam won't disarm himself."
141. Mr Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, stated on 19 December that Iraq was "well on its way to losing its last chance", and that there was a "practical limit" to how long the inspectors could be given to complete their work.[6]
142. Mr Straw told Secretary Powell on 30 December that the US and UK should develop a clear "plan B" postponing military action on the basis that inspections plus the threat of force were containing Saddam Hussein.[7]
- ↑ Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 11 December 2002, 'Iraq'.
- ↑ Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 16 December 2002, 'Prime Minister's Telephone Call with President Bush, 16 December'.
- ↑ The National Archives, 18 December 2002, Statement by Foreign Secretary on Iraq Declaration.
- ↑ JIC Assessment, 18 December 2002, 'An Initial Assessment of Iraq's WMD Declaration'.
- ↑ Feith DJ. War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism. HarperCollins, 2008.
- ↑ US Department of State Press Release, Press Conference Secretary of State Colin L Powell, Washington, 19 December 2002.
- ↑ Letter Straw to Manning, 30 December 2002, 'Iraq: Conversation with Colin Powell, 30 December'.
