The gap between the Permanent Members of the Security Council widens
162. In their reports to the Security Council on 14 February:
- Dr Blix reported that UNMOVIC had not found any weapons of mass destruction and the items that were not accounted for might not exist, but Iraq needed to provide the evidence to answer the questions, not belittle them.
- Dr Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), reported that the IAEA had found no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear‑related activities in Iraq although a number of issues were still under investigation.[1]
163. In the subsequent debate, members of the Security Council voiced widely divergent views.
164. Mr Annan concluded that there were real differences on strategy and timing in the Security Council. Iraq's non‑co‑operation was insufficient to bring members to agree that war was justified; they would only move if they came to their own judgement that inspections were pointless.[2]
165. On 19 February, Mr Blair sent President Bush a six‑page Note. He proposed focusing on the absence of full co‑operation and a "simple" resolution stating that Iraq had failed to take the final opportunity, with a side statement defining tough tests of co‑operation and a vote on 14 March to provide a deadline for action.[3]
166. President Bush and Mr Blair agreed to introduce a draft resolution at the UN the following week but its terms were subject to further discussion.[4]
167. On 20 February, Mr Blair told Dr Blix that he wanted to offer the US an alternative strategy which included a deadline and tests for compliance.[5] He did not think Saddam Hussein would co‑operate but he would try to get Dr Blix as much time as possible. Iraq could have signalled a change of heart in the December declaration. The Americans did not think that Saddam was going to co‑operate: "Nor did he. But we needed to keep the international community together."
168. Dr Blix stated that full co‑operation was a nebulous concept; and a deadline of 15 April would be too early. Dr Blix commented that "perhaps there was not much WMD in Iraq after all". Mr Blair responded that "even German and French intelligence were sure that there was WMD in Iraq". Dr Blix said they seemed "unsure" about "mobile BW
- ↑ UN Security Council, '4707th Meeting Friday 14 February 2003' (S/PV.4707).
- ↑ Telegram 268 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 15 February 2003, 'Foreign Secretary's Meeting with the UN Secretary‑General: 14 February'.
- ↑ Letter Manning to Rice, 19 February 2003, 'Iraq' attaching Note [Blair to Bush], [undated], 'Note'.
- ↑ Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 19 February 2003, 'Iraq and MEPP: Prime Minister's Telephone Conversation with Bush, 19 February'.
- ↑ Letter Cannon to Owen, 20 February 2003, 'Iraq: Prime Minister's Conversation with Blix'.
