Page:The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary.pdf/29

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Executive Summary

production facilities": "It would be paradoxical and absurd if 250,000 men were to invade Iraq and find very little."

169. Mr Blair responded that "our intelligence was clear that Saddam had reconstituted his WMD programme".

170. On 24 February, the UK, US and Spain tabled a draft resolution stating that Iraq had failed to take the final opportunity offered by resolution 1441 and that the Security Council had decided to remain seized of the matter.[1] The draft failed to attract support.

171. France, Germany and Russia responded by tabling a memorandum, building on their tripartite declaration of 10 February, stating that "full and effective disarmament" remained "the imperative objective of the international community".[2] That "should be achieved peacefully through the inspection regime". The "conditions for using force" had "not been fulfilled". The Security Council "must step up its efforts to give a real chance to the peaceful settlement of the crisis".

172. On 25 February, Mr Blair told the House of Commons that the intelligence was "clear" that Saddam Hussein continued "to believe that his weapons of mass destruction programme is essential both for internal repression and for external aggression".[3] It was also "essential to his regional power". "Prior to the inspectors coming back in", Saddam Hussein "was engaged in a systematic exercise in concealment of those weapons". The inspectors had reported some co‑operation on process, but had "denied progress on substance".

173. The House of Commons was asked on 26 February to reaffirm its endorsement of resolution 1441, support the Government's continuing efforts to disarm Iraq, and to call upon Iraq to recognise that this was its final opportunity to comply with its obligations.[4]

174. The Government motion was approved by 434 votes to 124; 199 MPs voted for an amendment which invited the House to "find the case for military action against Iraq as yet unproven".[5]

175. In a speech on 26 February, President Bush stated that the safety of the American people depended on ending the direct and growing threat from Iraq.[6]

176. President Bush also set out his hopes for the future of Iraq.


  1. Telegram 302 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 25 February 2003, 'Iraq: Tabling of US/UK/Spanish Draft Resolution: Draft Resolution'.
  2. UN Security Council, 24 February 2003, 'Letter dated 24 February 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council' (S/2003/214).
  3. House of Commons, Official Report, 25 February 2003, columns 123‑126.
  4. House of Commons, Official Report, 26 February 2003, column 265.
  5. House of Commons, Official Report, 26 February 2003, columns 367‑371.
  6. The White House, 26 February 2003, President discusses the future of Iraq.
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