192. Mr Straw told the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) on 4 March that it was “a matter of fact” that Iraq had been in material breach “for some weeks” and resolution 1441 provided sufficient legal authority to justify military action against Iraq if it was “in further material breach”.[1]
193. Mr Straw also stated that a majority of members of the Security Council had been opposed to the suggestion that resolution 1441 should state explicitly that military action could be taken only if there were a second resolution.
194. Mr Blair was informed on the evening of 4 March that US military planners were looking at 12 March as the possible start date for the military campaign; and that Mr Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, was concerned about the apparent disconnect with activity in the UN.[2]
195. Baroness Amos, Minister of State, Department for International Development (DFID), advised on 4 March that Angola, Cameroon and Guinea were not yet ready to commit to a “yes vote” and had emphasised the need for P5 unity.[3]
196. Sir Christopher Hum, British Ambassador to China, advised on 4 March that, if the resolution was put to a vote that day, China would abstain.[4]
197. Sir John Holmes, British Ambassador to France, advised on 4 March that France’s main aim was to “avoid being put on the spot” by influencing the undecided, preventing the US and UK mustering nine votes, and keeping alongside the Russians and Chinese; and that there was “nothing that we can now do to dissuade them from this course”.[5] Sir John also advised that “nothing the French say at this stage, even privately, should be taken at face value”.
198. Mr Igor Ivanov, the Russian Foreign Minister, told Mr Straw on 4 March that Russia had failed in an attempt to persuade Saddam Hussein to leave and it would veto a resolution based on the draft circulated on 24 February.[6]
199. France, Germany and Russia stated on 5 March that they would not let a resolution pass that authorised the use of force.[7] Russia and France, “as Permanent Members of the Security Council, will assume all their responsibilities on this point”.
- ↑ Minutes, Foreign Affairs Committee (House of Commons), 4 March 2003, [Evidence Session], Qs 151 and 154.
- ↑ Letter Watkins to Manning, 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Timing of Military Action’.
- ↑ Minute Amos to Foreign Secretary, 4 March 2003, [untitled].
- ↑ Telegram 90 Beijing to FCO London, 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Lobbying the Chinese’.
- ↑ Telegram 110 Paris to FCO London, 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Avoiding a French Veto’.
- ↑ Telegram 37 FCO London to Moscow, 3 [sic] March 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s Meetings with Russian Foreign Minister, 4 March’.
- ↑ The Guardian, 5 March 2003, UN war doubters unite against resolution; The Guardian, 6 March 2003, Full text of Joint declaration.
