248. When Mr Blair and President Bush discussed the position late on 11 March, it was clear that President Bush was determined not to postpone the start of military action.[1] They discussed the impact of President Chirac’s “veto threats”. Mr Blair considered that resident Chirac’s remarks “gave some cover” for ending the UN route.
249. Reporting discussions in New York on 11 March on the draft resolution and details of a possible “side statement”, Sir Jeremy Greenstock advised that the draft resolution tabled by the UK, US and Spain on 7 March had “no chance ... of adoption”.[2]
250. In a telephone call with President Bush on 12 March, Mr Blair proposed that the US and UK should continue to seek a compromise in the UN, while confirming that he knew it would not happen. He would say publicly that the French had prevented them from securing a resolution, so there would not be one.[3]
251. Mr Blair wanted to avoid a gap between the end of the negotiating process and the Parliamentary vote in which France or another member of the Security Council might table a resolution that attracted the support of a majority of the Council. That could have undermined the UK (and US) position on its legal basis for action.
252. When he discussed the options with Mr Straw early on 12 March, Mr Blair decided that the UK would continue to support the US.[4]
253. During Prime Minister’s Questions on 12 March, Mr Blair stated:
“I hope that even now those countries that are saying they would use their veto no matter what the circumstances will reconsider and realise that by doing so they put at risk not just the disarmament of Saddam, but the unity of the United Nations.”[5]
254. The FCO assessed on 12 March that the votes of the three African states were reasonably secure but Pakistan’s vote was not so certain. It was hoped that the six tests plus a short extension of the 17 March deadline might deliver Mexico and Chile.[6]
255. The UK circulated its draft side statement setting out the six tests to a meeting of Security Council members in New York on the evening of 12 March.[7]
256. Sir Jeremy Greenstock told Council members that the UK “non‑paper” responded to an approach from the “undecided six”[8] looking for a way forward, setting out six
- ↑ Letter Cannon to McDonald, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversations with Bush and Lagos, 11 March’.
- ↑ Telegram 417 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 12 March 2003, ‘Personal Iraq: Side Statement and End Game Options’.
- ↑ Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 12 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Telephone Conversation with President Bush, 12 March’.
- ↑ Public hearing, 21 January 2010, page 105.
- ↑ House of Commons, Official Report, 12 March 2003, column 288.
- ↑ Telegram 33 FCO London to Riyadh, 12 March 2003, ‘Personal for Heads of Mission: Iraq: The Endgame’.
- ↑ Telegram 429 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Side‑Statement’.
- ↑ Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Guinea, Mexico, Pakistan.
