tasks to be achieved in a 10‑day timeline.[1] Sir Jeremy reported that France, Germany and Russia all said that the draft resolution without operative paragraph 3 would still authorise force. The UK had not achieved “any kind of breakthrough” and there were “serious questions about the available time”, which the US would “not help us to satisfy”.
257. Mr Blair told Cabinet on 13 March that work continued in the UN to obtain a second resolution and, following the French decision to veto, the outcome remained open.[2]
258. Mr Straw described President Chirac’s position as “irresponsible”.
259. Mr Straw told Cabinet that there was “good progress” in gaining support in the Security Council.
260. Mr Blair concluded that the French position “looked to be based on a calculation of strategic benefit”. It was “in contradiction of the Security Council’s earlier view that military action would follow if Iraq did not fully and unconditionally co‑operate with the inspectors”. The UK would “continue to show flexibility” in its efforts to achieve a second resolution and, “if France could be shown to be intransigent, the mood of the Security Council could change towards support for the British draft”.
261. Mr Blair agreed the military plan later on 13 March.[3]
262. On 13 March, Mr Blair and President Bush discussed withdrawing the resolution on 17 March followed by a US ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to leave within 48 hours. There would be no US military action until after the vote in the House of Commons on 18 March.[4]
263. Mr Blair continued to press President Bush to publish the Road Map on the Middle East Peace Process because of its impact on domestic opinion in the UK as well as its strategic impact.
264. Reporting developments in New York on 13 March, Sir Jeremy Greenstock warned that the UK tests had attracted no support, and that the US might be ready to call a halt to the UN process on 15 March.[5] The main objections had included the “perceived authorisation of force in the draft resolution” and a desire to wait for UNMOVIC’s own list of key tasks which would be issued early the following week.
265. President Chirac told Mr Blair on 14 March that France was “content to proceed ‘in the logic of UNSCR 1441’; but it could not accept an ultimatum or any ‘automaticity’ of recourse to force”.[6] He proposed looking at a new resolution in line with
- ↑ Telegram 428 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Circulates Side‑Statement’.
- ↑ Cabinet Conclusions, 13 March 2003.
- ↑ Letter Rycroft to Watkins, 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Planning’.
- ↑ Letter Cannon to McDonald, 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Timetable’.
- ↑ Telegram 438 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: 13 March’.
- ↑ Letter Cannon to Owen, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with President Chirac, 14 March’.
