resolution 1441, “provided that it excluded these options”. President Chirac “suggested that the UNMOVIC work programme might provide a way forward. France was prepared to look at reducing the 120 day timeframe it envisaged.”
266. In response to a question from President Chirac about whether it would be the inspectors or the Security Council who decided whether Saddam had co‑operated, Mr Blair “insisted that it must be the Security Council”.
267. President Chirac agreed, “although the Security Council should make its judgement on the basis of the inspectors’ report”. He “wondered whether it would be worth” Mr Straw and Mr Dominique de Villepin, the French Foreign Minister, “discussing the situation to see if we could find some flexibility”; or was it “too late”?
268. Mr Blair said, “every avenue must be explored”.
269. In the subsequent conversation with President Bush about the French position and what to say when the resolution was pulled, Mr Blair proposed that they would need to show that France would not authorise the use of force in any circumstances.[1]
270. President Lagos initially informed Mr Blair on 14 March that the UK proposals did not have Chile’s support and that he was working on other ideas.[2] He subsequently informed Mr Blair that he would not pursue his proposals unless Mr Blair or President Bush asked him to.
271. Mr Tony Brenton, Chargé d’Affaires, British Embassy Washington, reported that President Bush was determined to remove Saddam Hussein and to stick to the US timetable for action. The UK’s “steadfastness” had been “invaluable” in bringing in other countries in support of action.[3]
272. In a declaration on 15 March, France, with Germany and Russia, attempted to secure support in the Security Council for continued inspections.[4]
273. At the Azores Summit on 16 March, President Bush, Mr Blair and Prime Minister José María Aznar of Spain agreed that, unless there was a fundamental change in the next 24 hours, the UN process would end.[5]
274. In public, the focus was on a “last chance for peace”. The joint communiqué contained a final appeal to Saddam Hussein to comply with his obligations and to the Security Council to back a second resolution containing an ultimatum.
- ↑ Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with Bush, 14 March’.
- ↑ Letter [Francis] Campbell to Owen, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with President Lagos of Chile, 14 March’.
- ↑ Telegram 350 Washington to FCO London, 15 March 2003, ‘Iraq’.
- ↑ UN Security Council, 18 March 2003, ‘Letter dated 15 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (S/2003/320).
- ↑ Letter Manning to McDonald, 16 March 2013, ‘Iraq: Summit Meeting in the Azores: 16 March’.
