Page:The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary.pdf/44

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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry


291.  Early on the morning of 20 March, US forces crossed into Iraq and seized the port area of Umm Qasr.[1]

292.  Mr Blair continued to state that France was responsible for the impasse.

293.  At Cabinet on 20 March, Mr Blair concluded that the Government:

“... should lose no opportunity to propagate the reason, at every level and as widely as possible, why we had arrived at a diplomatic impasse, and why it was necessary to take action against Iraq. France had not been prepared to accept that Iraq’s failure to comply with its obligations should lead to the use of force to achieve compliance.”[2]

Why Iraq? Why now?

294.  In his memoir, Mr Blair described his speech opening the debate on 18 March as “the most important speech I had ever made”.[3]

295.  Mr Blair framed the decision for the House of Commons as a “tough” and “stark” choice between “retreat” and holding firm to the course of action the Government had set. Mr Blair stated that he believed “passionately” in the latter. He deployed a wide range of arguments to explain the grounds for military action and to make a persuasive case for the Government’s policy.[4]

296.  In setting out his position, Mr Blair recognised the gravity of the debate and the strength of opposition in both the country and Parliament to immediate military action. In his view, the issue mattered “so much” because the outcome would not just determine the fate of the Iraqi regime and the Iraqi people but would:

“... determine the way in which Britain and the world confront the central security threat of the 21st century, the development of the United Nations, the relationship between Europe and the United States, the relations within the European Union and the way in which the United States engages with the rest of the world. So it could hardly be more important. It will determine the pattern of international politics for the next generation.”

Was Iraq a serious or imminent threat?

297.  On 18 March 2003, the House of Commons was asked:

  • to recognise that Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles, and its continuing non‑compliance with Security Council resolutions, posed a threat to international peace and security; and

  1. Ministry of Defence, Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future, December 2003, page 12.
  2. Cabinet Conclusions, 20 March 2003.
  3. Blair T. A Journey. Hutchinson, 2010.
  4. House of Commons, Official Report, 18 March 2003, columns 760‑774.