305. Mr Blair also described a “threat of chaos and disorder” arising from “tyrannical
regimes with weapons of mass destruction and extreme terrorist groups” prepared
to use them.
306. Mr Blair set out his concerns about:
• proliferators of nuclear equipment or expertise;
• “dictatorships with highly repressive regimes” who were “desperately trying to acquire” chemical, biological or, “particularly, nuclear weapons capability” – some of those were “a short time away from having a serviceable nuclear weapon”, and that activity was increasing, not diminishing; and
• the possibility of terrorist groups obtaining and using weapons of mass destruction, including a “radiological bomb”.
307. Those two threats had very different motives and different origins. He accepted “fully” that the association between the two was:
“... loose – but it is hardening. The possibility of the two coming together – of terrorist groups in possession of weapons of mass destruction or even of a so called dirty radiological bomb – is now in my judgement, a real and present danger to Britain and its national security.”
308. Later in his speech, Mr Blair stated that the threat which Saddam Hussein’s arsenal posed:
“... to British citizens at home and abroad cannot simply be contained. Whether in the hands of his regime or in the hands of the terrorists to whom he would give his weapons, they pose a clear danger to British citizens ...”
309. This fusion of long‑standing concerns about proliferation with the post‑9/11 concerns about mass‑casualty terrorism was at the heart of the Government’s case for taking action at this time against Iraq.
310. The UK assessment of Iraq’s capabilities set out in Section 4 of the Report shows:
• The proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems, particularly ballistic missiles, was regarded as a major threat. But Iran, North Korea and Libya were of greater concern than Iraq in terms of the risk of
nuclear and missile proliferation.
• JIC Assessments, reflected in the September 2002 dossier, had consistently taken the view that, if sanctions were removed or became ineffective, it would take Iraq at least five years following the end of sanctions to produce enough fissile material for a weapon. On 7 March, the IAEA had reported to the Security Council that there was no indication that Iraq had resumed its nuclear activities.
• The September dossier stated that Iraq could produce a nuclear weapon within one to two years if it obtained fissile material and other essential components
