from a foreign supplier. There was no evidence that Iraq had tried to acquire fissile material and other components or – were it able to do so – that it had the technical capabilities to turn these materials into a usable weapon.
- JIC Assessments had identified the possible stocks of chemical and biological weapons which would largely have been for short‑range, battlefield use by the Iraqi armed forces. The JIC had also judged in the September dossier that Iraq was producing chemical and biological agents and that there were development programmes for longer‑range missiles capable of delivering them.
- Iraq’s proscribed Al Samoud 2 missiles were being destroyed.
311. The UK Government did have significant concerns about the potential risks of all types of weapons of mass destruction being obtained by Islamist extremists (in particular Al Qaida) who would be prepared to use such weapons.
312. Saddam Hussein’s regime had the potential to proliferate material and know‑how, to terrorist groups, but it was not judged likely to do so.
313. On 28 November 2001, the JIC assessed that:
- Saddam Hussein had “refused to permit any Al Qaida presence in Iraq”.
- “With common enemies ... there was clearly scope for collaboration.”
- Evidence of contact between Iraq and Usama Bin Laden (UBL) was “fragmentary and uncorroborated”; including that Iraq had been in contact with Al Qaida for exploratory discussions on toxic materials in late 1988.
- There was “no evidence that these contacts led to practical co‑operation; we judge it unlikely ... There is no evidence UBL’s organisation has ever had a presence in Iraq.”
- Practical co‑operation between Iraq and Al Qaida was “unlikely because of mutual mistrust”.
- There was “no credible evidence of covert transfers of WMD‑related technology and expertise to terrorist groups”.[1]
314. On 29 January 2003, the JIC assessed that, despite the presence of terrorists in Iraq “with links to Al Qaida”, there was “no intelligence of current co‑operation between Iraq and Al Qaida”.[2]
315. On 10 February 2003, the JIC judged that Al Qaida would “not carry out attacks under Iraqi direction”.[3]
