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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Contents
| Introduction | 4 |
| Pre‑conflict strategy and planning | 5 |
| The UK decision to support US military action | 6 |
| UK policy before 9/11 | 6 |
| The impact of 9/11 | 10 |
| Decision to take the UN route | 16 |
| Negotiation of resolution 1441 | 19 |
| The prospect of military action | 21 |
| The gap between the Permanent Members of the Security Council widens | 24 |
| The end of the UN route | 30 |
| Why Iraq? Why now? | 40 |
| Was Iraq a serious or imminent threat? | 40 |
| The predicted increase in the threat to the UK as a result of military action in Iraq | 47 |
| The UK’s relationship with the US | 51 |
| Decision‑making | 54 |
| Collective responsibility | 55 |
| Advice on the legal basis for military action | 62 |
| The timing of Lord Goldsmith’s advice on the interpretation of resolution 1441 | 63 |
| Lord Goldsmith’s advice of 7 March 2003 | 65 |
| Lord Goldsmith’s arrival at a “better view” | 66 |
| The exchange of letters on 14 and 15 March 2003 | 66 |
| Lord Goldsmith’s Written Answer of 17 March 2003 | 67 |
| Cabinet, 17 March 2003 | 68 |
| Weapons of mass destruction | 69 |
| Iraq WMD assessments, pre‑July 2002 | 69 |
| Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002 | 72 |
| Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003 | 75 |
| The search for WMD | 77 |
