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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
| Planning for a post‑Saddam Hussein Iraq | 78 |
| The failure to plan or prepare for known risks | 78 |
| The planning process and decision‑making | 81 |
| The post‑conflict period | 86 |
| Occupation | 86 |
| Looting in Basra | 86 |
| Looting in Baghdad | 88 |
| UK influence on post‑invasion strategy: resolution 1483 | 89 |
| UK influence on the Coalition Provisional Authority | 90 |
| A decline in security | 93 |
| The turning point | 96 |
| Transition | 97 |
| UK influence on US strategy post‑CPA | 97 |
| Planning for withdrawal | 97 |
| The impact of Afghanistan | 99 |
| Iraqiisation | 101 |
| Preparation for withdrawal | 103 |
| A major divergence in strategy | 103 |
| A possible civil war | 104 |
| Force Level Review | 107 |
| The beginning of the end | 108 |
| Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq? | 109 |
| Key findings | 111 |
| Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January 2002 | 111 |
| Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 – “axis of evil” to Crawford | 111 |
| Development of UK strategy and options, April to July 2002 | 112 |
| Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September 2002 | 112 |
| Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002 – the negotiation of resolution 1441 | 113 |
| Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January 2003 | 113 |
| Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003 | 114 |
| Iraq WMD assessments, pre‑July 2002 | 115 |
| Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002 | 116 |
| Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003 | 117 |
| The search for WMD | 117 |
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