591. It showed that, in order to achieve the UK’s desired end state, any post‑conflict
administration would need to:
• restore infrastructure that had deteriorated significantly in the decade since 1991, to the point where it was not capable of meeting the needs of the Iraqi people;
• administer a state where the upper echelons of a regime that had been in power since 1968 had been abruptly removed and in which the capabilities of the wider civil administration, many of whose employees were members of the ruling party, were difficult to assess; and
• provide security in a country faced with a number of potential threats, including:
◦ internecine violence;
◦ terrorism; and
◦ Iranian interference.
592. In December 2002, the MOD described the post‑conflict phase of operations as “strategically decisive”.[1] But when the invasion began, the UK Government was not in a position to conclude that satisfactory plans had been drawn up and preparations made to meet known post‑conflict challenges and risks in Iraq and to mitigate the risk of strategic failure.
593. Throughout the planning process, the UK assumed that the US would be responsible for preparing the post‑conflict plan, that post‑conflict activity would be authorised by the UN Security Council, that agreement would be reached on a significant post‑conflict role for the UN and that international partners would step forward to share the post‑conflict burden.
594. On that basis, the UK planned to reduce its military contribution in Iraq to medium scale within four months of the start of the invasion[2] and expected not to have to make a substantial commitment to post‑conflict administration.[3]
595. Achieving that outcome depended on the UK’s ability to persuade the US of the merits of a significant post‑conflict role for the UN.
596. The UK could not be certain at any stage in the year before the invasion that it would succeed in that aim.
597. In January 2003, the UK sought to persuade the US of the benefits of UN leadership of Iraq’s interim post‑conflict civil administration.[4] Officials warned that,
- ↑ Paper [SPG], 13 December 2002, ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on Iraq’.
- ↑ Minute CDS to CJO, 18 March 2003, ‘Op TELIC: Authorisation for Military Operations in Iraq’ attaching Paper CDS, ‘Chief of Defence Staff Execute Directive to the Joint Commander for Operation TELIC (Phases 3 and 4)’.
- ↑ Minute Straw and Hoon to Prime Minister, 19 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Military Contribution to post‑conflict Iraq’.
- ↑ Minute Ricketts to Private Secretary [FCO], 7 February 2003, ‘Iraq Strategy’.
