The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
if the UK failed to persuade the US, it risked “being drawn into a huge commitment of UK resources for a highly complex task of administration and law and order for an uncertain period”.
598. By March 2003, having failed to persuade the US of the advantages of a UN‑led interim administration, the UK had set the less ambitious goal of persuading the US to accept UN authorisation of a Coalition‑led interim administration and an international presence that would include the UN.[1]
599. On 19 March, Mr Blair stated in Parliament that discussions were taking place with the US, UN and others on the role of the UN and post‑conflict issues.[2]
600. Discussions continued, but, as the invasion began:
• The UK had not secured US agreement to a Security Council resolution authorising post‑conflict administration and could not be sure when, or on what terms, agreement would be possible.
• The extent of the UN’s preparations, which had been hindered by the absence of agreement on post‑conflict arrangements, remained uncertain. Mr Annan emphasised to Ms Short the need for clarity on US thinking so that UN planning could proceed[3] and told Sir Jeremy Greenstock that he “would not wish to see any arrangement subjugating UN activity to Coalition activity”.[4]
• Potential international partners for reconstruction and additional Coalition partners to provide security continued to make their post‑conflict contributions conditional on UN authorisation for Phase IV (the military term for post‑conflict operations).[5]
601. Despite being aware of the shortcomings of the US plan,[6] strong US resistance to a leading role for the UN,[7] indications that the UN did not want the administration of Iraq to become its responsibility[8] and a warning about the tainted image of the UN in Iraq,[9] at no stage did the UK Government formally consider other policy options, including the possibility of making participation in military action conditional on a satisfactory plan for the post‑conflict period, or how to mitigate the known risk that the UK could find itself drawn into a “huge commitment of UK resources” for which no contingency preparations had been made.
- ↑ Paper Iraq Planning Unit, 25 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Phase IV: Authorising UNSCR’.
- ↑ House of Commons, Official Report, 19 March 2003, columns 931‑932.
- ↑ Telegram 501 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 21 March 2003, ‘Iraq Humanitarian/Reconstruction: Clare Short’s Visit to New York’.
- ↑ Telegram 526 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 25 March 2003, ‘Iraq Phase IV: UN Dynamics’.
- ↑ Paper FCO, 25 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Phase IV Issues’.
- ↑ Minute Drummond to Rycroft, 19 March 2003, ‘Iraq Ministerial Meeting’.
- ↑ Minute Ricketts to Private Secretary [FCO], 7 February 2003, ‘Iraq Strategy’.
- ↑ Public hearing, 15 December 2009, page 5.
- ↑ Paper Middle East Department, 12 December 2002, ‘Interim Administrations in Iraq: Why a UN‑led Interim Administration would be in the US interest’.
