The planning process and decision‑making
602. As a junior partner in the Coalition, the UK worked within a planning framework established by the US. It had limited influence over a process dominated increasingly by the US military.
603. The creation of the Ad Hoc Group on Iraq in September 2002 and the Iraq Planning Unit in February 2003 improved co‑ordination across government at official level, but neither body carried sufficient authority to establish a unified planning process across the four principal departments involved – the FCO, the MOD, DFID and the Treasury – or between military and civilian planners.
604. Important material, including in the DFID reviews of northern and southern Iraq, and significant pieces of analysis, including the series of MOD Strategic Planning Group (SPG) papers on military strategic thinking, were either not shared outside the originating department, or, as appears to have been the case with the SPG papers, were not routinely available to all those with a direct interest in the contents.
605. Some risks were identified, but departmental ownership of those risks, and responsibility for analysis and mitigation, were not clearly established.
606. When the need to plan and prepare for the worst case was raised, including by MOD officials in advice to Mr Hoon on 6 March 2003,[1] Lieutenant General John Reith, Chief of Joint Operations, in his paper for the Chiefs of Staff on 21 March[2] and in Treasury advice to Mr Brown on 24 March,[3] there is no evidence that any department or individual assumed ownership or was assigned responsibility for analysis or mitigation. No action ensued.
607. In April 2003, Mr Blair set up the Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq Rehabilitation (AHMGIR), chaired by Mr Straw, to oversee the UK contribution to post‑conflict reconstruction.
608. Until the creation of the AHMGIR, Mr Straw, Mr Hoon and Ms Short remained jointly responsible for directing post‑conflict planning and preparation.
609. In the absence of a single person responsible for overseeing all aspects of planning and preparation, departments pursued complementary, but separate, objectives. Gaps in UK capabilities were overlooked.
610. The FCO, which focused on policy‑making and negotiation, was not equipped by past experience or practice, or by its limited human and financial resources, to prepare for nation‑building of the scale required in Iraq, and did not expect to do so.
- ↑ Minute Sec(O)4 to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 6 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Aftermath – Medium to Long Term UK Military Commitment’.
- ↑ Minute Reith to COSSEC, 21 March 2003, ‘Phase IV Planning – Taking Stock’.
- ↑ Minute Dodds to Chancellor, 24 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Military Contribution to Post‑Conflict Iraq’.
