The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
Washington after the Rock Drill on 21 and 22 February 2003: “The inter‑agency rehearsal for Phase IV … exposes the enormous scale of the task … Overall, planning is at a very rudimentary stage”[1]);
- the need to agree with the US the nature of the UK contribution to those plans (including in the letter from Mr Hoon’s Private Office to Sir David Manning on 28 February 2003: it was “absolutely clear” that the US expected the UK to take leadership of the South‑East sector. The UK was “currently at risk of taking on a very substantial commitment that we will have great difficulty in sustaining beyond the immediate conclusion of conflict”[2]); and
- the importance (including in the ‘UK overall plan for Phase IV’, shown to Mr Blair on 7 March 2003[3]) of:
◦ UN authorisation for the military occupation of Iraq, without which there would be no legal cover for certain post‑conflict tasks;
◦ a UN framework for the administration and reconstruction of Iraq during the transition to Iraqi self‑government.
627. Mr Blair told the Chiefs of Staff on 15 January 2003 that “the ‘Issue’ was aftermath – the Coalition must prevent anarchy and internecine fighting breaking out”.[4]
628. In his evidence to the House of Commons Liaison Committee on 21 January 2003, Mr Blair emphasised the importance of the post‑conflict phase:
“You do not engage in military conflict that may produce regime change unless you are prepared to follow through and work in the aftermath of that regime change to ensure the country is stable and the people are properly looked after.”[5]
629. On 24 January 2003, Mr Blair told President Bush that the biggest risk they faced was internecine fighting, and that delay would allow time for working up more coherent post‑conflict plans.[6]
630. Yet when Mr Blair set out the UK’s vision for the future of Iraq in the House of Commons on 18 March 2003, no assessment had been made of whether that vision was achievable, no agreement had been reached with the US on a workable post‑conflict plan, UN authorisation had not yet been secured, and there had been no decision on the UN’s role in post‑conflict Iraq.
- ↑ Telegram 235 Washington to FCO London, 24 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Day After: Rehearsal of Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance’.
- ↑ Letter Williams to Manning, 28 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Planning and Preparation’ attaching Paper [unattributed], 28 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Planning Update – 28 February 2003’.
- ↑ Paper Iraq Planning Unit, 7 March 2003, ‘The UK overall plan for Phase IV’.
- ↑ Minute MA/DCJO to MA/CJO, 15 January 2003, ‘Briefing to Prime Minister’.
- ↑ Liaison Committee, Session 2002‑2003, Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Liaison Committee Tuesday 21 January 2003, Q 117.
- ↑ Letter Manning to Rice, 24 January 2003, [untitled] attaching ‘Note’.
