Executive Summary
631. UK policy rested on the assumption that:
- the US would provide effective leadership of the immediate post‑conflict effort in Iraq;
- the conditions would soon be in place for UK military withdrawal;
- after a short period of US‑led, UN‑authorised military occupation, the UN would administer and provide a framework for the reconstruction of post‑conflict Iraq;
- substantial international support would follow UN authorisation; and
- reconstruction and the political transition to Iraqi rule would proceed in a secure environment.
632. Mr Blair was already aware that those assumptions concealed significant risks:
- UK officials assessed that the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), the US body that would assume responsibility for the immediate post‑invasion administration of Iraq, was not up to the task.
- Significant differences remained between UK and US positions on UN involvement, and between the UK and the UN.
- International partners were scarce and thought to be unlikely to come forward in the absence of UN authorisation.
- UK officials recognised that occupying forces would not remain welcome for long and threats to security could quickly escalate.
633. In the year before the invasion, Mr Blair:
- stated his belief in the importance of post‑conflict planning on several occasions, including in Cabinet, in Parliament and with President Bush;
- requested advice on aspects of post‑conflict Iraq (including for his summer reading pack in July 2002, for his meeting with President Bush on 31 January 2003, and twice in February 2003 after reading the JIC Assessment of southern Iraq and the Adelphi Paper Iraq at the Crossroads);
- at the meeting with Mr Hoon and the Chiefs of Staff on 15 January 2003, asked the MOD to consider the “big ‘what ifs’” in the specific context of the UK military plan;
- convened a Ministerial meeting on post‑conflict issues on 6 March 2003;
- raised concerns about the state of planning with President Bush; and
- succeeded in the narrow goal of securing President Bush’s agreement that the UN should be “heavily involved” in “the post‑conflict situation”, a loose formulation that appeared to bridge the gap between US and UK positions on UN authorisation and the post‑conflict role of the UN, but did not address the substantive issues.
85
