The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
634. Mr Blair did not:
- establish clear Ministerial oversight of post‑conflict strategy, planning and preparation;
- ensure that Ministers took the decisions needed to prepare a flexible, realistic and fully resourced plan integrating UK military and civilian contributions;
- seek adequate assurances that the UK was in a position to meet its likely obligations in Iraq;
- insist that the UK’s strategic objectives for Iraq were tested against anything other than the best case: a well‑planned and executed US‑led and UN‑authorised post‑conflict operation in a relatively benign security environment;
- press President Bush for definitive assurances about US post‑conflict plans or set out clearly to him the strategic risk in underestimating the post‑conflict challenge and failing adequately to prepare for the task; or
- consider, or seek advice on, whether the absence of a satisfactory plan was a sufficient threat to UK strategic objectives to require a reassessment of the terms of the UK engagement in Iraq. Despite concerns about the state of US planning, he did not make agreement on a satisfactory post‑conflict plan a condition of UK participation in military action.
635. In the weeks immediately following the invasion, Mr Blair’s omissions made it more difficult for the UK Government to take an informed decision on the establishment of the UK’s post‑conflict Area of Responsibility (AOR) in southern Iraq (addressed in more detail in Section 8).
636. In the short to medium term, his omissions increased the risk that the UK would be unable to respond to the unexpected in Iraq.
637. In the longer term, they reduced the likelihood of achieving the UK’s strategic objectives in Iraq.
The post‑conflict period
Occupation
LOOTING IN BASRA
638. As described in Section 8, UK forces entered Basra City on the night of 6/7 April 2003 and rapidly gained control, meeting less resistance than anticipated. Once the city was under its control, the UK was responsible, as the Occupying Power, for maintenance of law and order. Within its predominantly Shia Area of Operations, the UK assumed that risks to Coalition Forces would be lower than in the so‑called “Sunni triangle” controlled by the US.
