to deal only with such objects as aie existent at the same time with itself; and accordingly memory, logical inference, revelation and yogic perception are shown to relate to things which belong to a different time from that of their own existence or duration (pp. 67-69.,). The reasoning involved in the supposition, that the antecedent non-exist- ence of consciousness is not at all made out by perception, is then pointed out to be untenable ; and it is shown that perceptual consciousness is conditioned by time, and that none of our cognising states of consciousness can be eternal or objectless (pp. 69-71.). Even during sleep, trance, and conditions of intoxication, consciousness cannot be absolute and altogether objectless, as there is no recollection what- soever of our having at any time had any experience of such consciousness. In all its states consciousness is asso- ciated with the idea of the ego, is definite and relates to particular objects; and hence it cannot be unoriginated and eternal (pp. 71-72.). And then the immodifiable character of consciousness is contended against, and it is shown that it cannot be undifferentiated (pp. 72-74.). The position that consciousness can have no qualifying attributes is next disproved (pp. 74-75.). Afterwards the question whether consciousness is the same as the self is taken up for consideration and criticism, and it is explained that consciousness cannot indeed be the same as the conscious subject, and that this conscious subject is permanent while the attribute of consciousness belonging to that subject is liable to be originated and destroyed ; and then it is demonstrated that the idea of an unfounded and object- less consciousness being the same as the self is contradict- ed by cognition, and that in consequence pure experience or absolute consciousness alone cannot be the highest real- ity (pp. 75-77-)
