After this the discussion of the problem of the soul's personality is commenced from the stand-point of Rama- nuja, and it is at first pointed out that what consti- tutes the subjective self or the soul of the individual is nothing other than the ego which is here called the thing '/'; similarly the thing ' thoit' or the objective world forms the content of the notion of the non- ego ; such being the case, how can the knower and the known be identical ? (pp. 77-79.)- If the thing ' I ' is the self, then, like the self, it must be intelligent and have at the same time intelligence to constitute its essence ; and it is explained and illustrated how the thing T may be both intelligence and intelligent at the same time. Then scriptural and other authorities are quoted to shew that the self-luminous self is always the knower, but that it is never mere luminousness (pp. 79-81.). Consciousness is like luminosity, and must necessarily belong to a luminous self ; this self is the intelligent thing T, and the luminosity or intelligibility of consciousness itself is due to its associa- tion with the self which is undoubtedly the knowing ego (pp. 81-83.). Having thus shown that intelligence forms the essence as well as an attribute of the thing T, the view of the Adwaitin that the idea of knowership is fal- sely superimposed upon the undiffereritiated and intelligent principle of consciousness by ignorance or avidyd is next contended against. It is first shown that the knowership of the ego cannot be due to illusion, for the reason that the thing T and its knowership are both separately and simultaneously cognised, unlike the mother-of-pearl and the silver superimposed thereon. It is next shewn that this knowership of the ego cannot be said to be due to the common error of mistaking the body for the self (pp. 83-84.). does this knowership belong to the material principle
