PLAN OF THE FLANK MARCH. 387 conquer for themselves new means of communi- chap, cation with the sea. On that, of course, their ' very existence was to depend ; and then, again, in the distance there would still lie before them the prospect of having to force the immensely- strong position of the Sapoun^ ridge ; for until that ridge should be carried, they could not even begin to attack the southern defences of Sebas- topol — defences of which, at this time, they knew very little. They had learnt, indeed, that on its land side, some two years before, the place was open ; but in knowledge of what might since have been done for its defence their minds were almost blank. The dangers and evils thus attaching to the plan of the ' flank march ' were of the gravest kind ; but the truth is, that the unwillingness of the French Commander to persist in the plan of attacking the north side of the place had brought the affairs of the Allies to such a state that, sup- posing his reluctance to continue, very little free- Ti.e iittie dom of choice could or would remain to Lord choice'iiu llaglan. He could not, of course, insult the Kagia'l French army by marching across its front to at- tack a work which was straight o])posite to their lines, and away from those of the English. And, although Lord Eaglan judged it to be his duty to uphold, to the Inst, the expediency of going on with tl^e old plan of campaign, and attacking the North Fort, he also felt that there M'as a limit to the urgency which could be appropriately ex- erted in that direction ; for it was evident that
