388 COUNSELS ENDING IN THE CHAP. V. Reasons teiKling to justify tlio resort to the flank march. to be beyond measure persistent in pressing and pressing the French Marshal to undertake an attack against liis declared will and judgment was not only a course which held out small pro- mise of good, but one which, if too far pursued, could liardly be otherwise than unbecoming, of- fensive, and impolitic. The thought of abandon- ing the expedition was not to be borne ; and, although it may be judged that next to an attack on the Star Fort, the most politic mode of con- quering the enemy's stronghold was by means of field operations carried on upon his lines of com- munication, yet the impatience of the English at home was so great, was so closely pointed to one object, and was, moreover, so hotl}^ shared by their Government, that a resort to any plan of campaign, however wisely conceived, which avoided a direct attack upon Sebastopol, would have been almost looked upon as a flinching from duty. Well, but if, for this reason, field operations could not well be proposed as a substitute for a direct attack upon Sebastopol, then what choice was left? The truth is, that the unwillingness nf the French to attack the north side of Se- bastopol had brought the Allies into straits so hard that, with all its rashness, the plan of defil- ing round the east of Sebastopol might be re- 'Tarded as the least of the evils from which a o choice could be made. Rightly looked at, ' the ' flank march ' — for so the movement is called — was a perilous, a desperate expedient, by which
