Page:Twentieth Century Impressions of Hongkong, Shanghai, and other Treaty Ports of China.djvu/81

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
TWENTIETH CENTURY IMPRESSIONS OF HONGKONG, SHANGHAI, ETC.
73

On the way a party of the British Coolie Corps was encountered, and these rough fellows seeing him in custody, put down their burdens and indulged in hearty laughter. This open contempt of the despised Hakkas caused Yeh to gnash his teeth in impotent rage. Probably he had never experienced in his whole life a greater insult, but he was not again to be subjected to the cynosure of rude Cantonese eyes, for his humiliating progress on this occasion was his last public appearance in Canton, or even in China. On account of his crimes and misdemeanours against foreigners, and they proved to be many, he was deported to Calcutta, there to spend the remaining two years of his life.

The seizure of Canton and the overthrow of Yeh were important achievements, but they left unsolved the larger problem of establishing direct diplomatic intercourse with the Chinese Government. When therefore, the war had been completed in the south, Lord Elgin and Baron Gros, the French representative, forwarded to the Chinese Government despatches recounting the proceedings adopted at Canton, and setting forth in conciliatory but firm language the demands which they had been commissioned to prefer. It was specifically stated that the official chosen to discuss affairs with them would be required to hold his commission direct from the Emperor. The communications in due course found their way to Peking and elicited a characteristically Chinese reply from Yuching, the Emperor's Chief Minister. In lofty style the missive discussed the position of affairs at Canton, describing the action taken by the allied powers as being "without parallel in the history of the past." But, the letter went on, "His Majesty is magnanimous and considerate. He has been pleased by a decree which we have had the honour to receive, to degrade Yeh from the Governor-Generalship of the Two Kwang for his maladministration and to despatch His Excellency Hwang to Kwantung as Imperial Commissioner in his stead to investigate and decide with impartiality; and it will of course behove the English Minister to wait in Kwantung and there make his arrangements. No Imperial Commissioner ever conducts business at Shanghai. There being a particular sphere of duty allotted to every official on the establishment of the Celestial Empire, and the principle that between them and the foreigner there is no intercourse being one ever religiously adhered to by the servants of our Government of China, it would not be proper for me to reply in person to the letter of the English Minister. Let Your Excellency, therefore, transmit to him all that I have said above, and his letter will in no way be left unanswered." The time had passed when British diplomatists could be diverted from their purpose by the evasive policy of the Peking Government, of which Yuching's letter is a good example. Lord Elgin, who had proceeded to Shanghai at the end of March, sent a reply from there, pointing out the serious character of the infractions of the Treaty of Nanking, and intimating that he proposed to proceed north in order to get into closer communication with the higher officials of the Imperial Government. In pursuance of plans already formed, Lord Elgin and his French colleague, early in April, proceeded to the mouth of the Peiho, the allied fleet meanwhile being directed to assemble at that point with all possible expedition. On arriving at their destination, the plenipotentiaries sent to Yuching a letter demanding in temperate language the appointment of a minister duly authorised by the Emperor, to discuss questions at issue. An intimation was given that if, at the expiry of six days, a satisfactory reply was not forthcoming, it would be considered that the pacific overtures of the plenipotentiaries had been rejected, and that other measures must be adopted to obtain satisfaction. The reply to this was the appointment of three commissioners of moderate rank, who lacked the requisite powers to negotiate. Some weeks were spent in abortive negotiations which at each successive stage emphasised the fact that the inordinate obstinacy and arrogance of the Chinese Government could only be overcome by the exercise of force. Lord Elgin, on his part, was ready to apply this touchstone to the problem at an early date, but, unfortunately, there was some misunderstanding about the movements of the fleet, and an adequate force was not at hand when wanted. In his irritation at the delay Lord Elgin penned a despatch home in which he complained in strong terms of Sir Michael Seymour's lack of energy, and he described the non-arrival of the fleet as "a most grievous disappointment," inasmuch as he believed that if he had had ten or twelve gunboats he would have been allowed by the forts to proceed, unresisted, to Tientsin, and that the Emperor's Government would have yielded at once everything that was demanded of them. Sir Michael Seymour was not directly approached on the subject by Lord Elgin, but when he became aware of the tenor of the allegations made against him he put in a defence which, in the view of all impartial and competent personages, was a complete vindication of his professional character and reputation. He directly traversed the idea that an early move up the river would have served to bring the Chinese to reason. Speaking from an experience of two years of Chinese warfare, he confidently asserted that "nothing but the conclusive evidence of irresistible force will ever fully satisfy the Imperial Government." As the despatch was written after the war he was able to strengthen his position by referring to the course of the final operations, which, in almost dramatic fashion, as we shall see, brought about a settlement. The controversy was decidedly an unfortunate one, and the manner in which it was raised reflected some little discredit on Lord Elgin.

A VIEW NEAR TIENTSIN.

By the middle of May the naval preparations were sufficiently advanced to enable Lord Elgin to put into execution his plan of campaign. On the 19th of the month the allied fleet, under the joint command of Sir Michael Seymour and Admiral Rigault de Genouilly, appeared off the forts and summoned the commandant to surrender. No reply to this demand being received, a bombardment was commenced, and it was so effective that at the end of an hour and a quarter it was possible to land parties to seize the practically deserted forts. Proceeding up the river the allied fleet was attacked in vigorous fashion by the Chinese, who made strenuous efforts to destroy the foreign vessels by means of fire ships. Their plans, however, were completely frustrated, and the invaders were able without much further difficulty to establish themselves firmly at the village or town of Taku. The losses incurred by the allied forces in the course of the operations were slight; they were a small price for the advantages gained, which were of a substantial and, as it proved, conclusive kind. By their victory the allies had free access to Tientsin, and with it the practical command of the Grand Canal and of a safe line of advance on Peking. The results achieved were so striking that even the Chinese Government was convinced. On learning the perilous position of affairs from the three commissioners, the Emperor despatched, with instructions to proceed with all haste, two high dignitaries—Kweiliang and Hwashana—to make terms with the troublesome foreigners. These imperial negotiators on appearing at Tientsin manifested the utmost anxiety to make terms, and as they were endowed with ample