Page:Twentieth Century Impressions of Hongkong, Shanghai, and other Treaty Ports of China.djvu/82

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TWENTIETH CENTURY IMPRESSIONS OF HONGKONG, SHANGHAI, ETC.

powers and were prepared to make the most liberal concessions, it seemed that peace was well in sight. The fair prospect was momentarily dimmed by the appearance on the scene of Keying, who as a sort of informal extra negotiator showed a disposition to enforce terms which fell considerably short of those which the two other commissioners were prepared to agree to. It appeared later that this was a desperate effort on the wily old Mandarin's part to reinstate himself in the favour of the Emperor. The scheme failed because the allied powers were too much in earnest to be induced to forego any of the fruits of their success. Keying went back to Peking a disappointed and disillusioned man. He was promptly arrested and brought before the Board of Punishment, who found him guilty of acting "with stupidity and precipitancy," and ordered him to be strangled. The sentence was not actually carried out because "as an act of extreme grace and justice" the Emperor sent him an order "to put an end to himself," which he obeyed. Meanwhile, the negotiations at Tientsin with the two approved commissioners were proceeding slowly but satisfactorily. Considerable opposition was manifested to the demand for a resident minister at Peking. Indeed, this was the crux of the negotiations. The commissioners represented that compliance with so unheard of a proposal would be perilous both to the minister who might be appointed and the Chinese Government. They also raised difficulties about etiquette, and revived the old question of the Kotow. Lord Elgin declined to be moved from the position which he had taken up at the outset, that there must, as an essential feature of any arrangement, be a provision for direct diplomatic intercourse. At length, on the 11th of June, the commissioners in a despatch practically conceded all demands. They suggested, however, that the visit of a British Ambassador to Peking should be deferred for a time. A treaty was drawn up on the terms of this despatch, and it was formally signed on the 26th of June. The ratifications were exchanged on the 4th of July. Afterwards the important question of the revision of the tariff was taken in hand. Great Britain acted in this matter alone, but there was no question of exclusive privileges, as a most favoured nation clause extended the concessions granted to all powers having treaties with China. The two imperial commissioners who had negotiated the Treaty of Tientsin were joined with the Viceroy of the Two Kiang to conduct the negotiations on the Chinese side, and Mr. (afterwards Sir Thomas) Wade and Mr. Oliphant (Lord Elgin's Secretary) represented the British. The parties met at Shanghai, and there threshed out the details with a commendable amount of expedition. In the result a striking set of regulations was agreed to. A maximum tariff of 5 per cent. ad valorem for both imports and exports is the guiding principle of the arrangement. But the most dramatic feature of the regulations was a clause legalising the importation of opium on the payment of a duty of thirty taels per chest. It was a concession wrung without any very serious difficulty from the Chinese. In their practical way they doubtless realised that while they were giving little, since opium was freely introduced in spite of imperial edicts, they were providing themselves with a useful weapon with which to attack the foreigner on the softer side. They were not slow to use it. Before the negotiations had been completed the commissioners reverted to the question of the establishment of a permanent diplomatic representative at Peking. Once more they represented the grave dangers which would attend the carrying out of the proposal, more especially in view of the Taeping Rebellion, and besought the British officials not to press the point. The latter were not insensible to the force of the arguments used. They also recognised that it was good policy at the moment to be conciliatory; so the question was allowed to stand over, though it was clearly intimated that there could be no falling away from the principle of direct diplomatic intercourse. Thus the Treaty of Tientsin was carried to completion with this one little loophole, which was subsequently to allow of the opening once more of the floodgates of war. Lord Elgin, when he left China on the completion of his work in March, 1859, could not be insensible to the risks which attended the situation. While the negotiations were in progress active steps were taken to restore the efficiency of the Peiho forts, and secret edicts were in circulation invoking the national spirit of the Chinese against the foreigner. At Canton there had been almost continuous trouble from the time of Yeh's deposition. In the city itself martial law rigorously administered by a British commissioner and a native governor repressed to some extent the turbulent instincts of the population. But in the adjacent districts persistent efforts were made, and not without success, to harass the barbarians. Investigations showed that the unrest was the work of the new Viceroy, Hwang, who had been sent to succeed Yeh, supported by a powerful committee of provincial notabilities. Such was the patriotic ardour which directed, or misdirected, the efforts of this combination, that a reward was offered on its behalf of thirty thousand dollars for the head of Mr. Parkes. The occupation was prolonged in consequence of these manifestations, and measures were adopted to convince the Chinese that hostility to the foreigner was a policy which did not pay. In course of time, by means of well-arranged expeditions to centres of disturbance, a more peaceful spirit was infused into the relations between the two races. But the impression was left that the full lesson which the military operations were intended to convey had not been learned.


CHAPTER XIII.

The Third Campaign—Repulse of the British Fleet by the Taku Forts—Despatch of allied British and French Expeditionary Force—Capture of the Taku Forts—Advance on Peking—Mr. Parkes, Mr. Loch, and others made Captives by the Chinese—Attack on Peking—Occupation of the Summer Palace and its subsequent Destruction—The Treaty of Peking.

If the British Government could have had the arrangement of the course of events nothing would have suited it better than to allow trade to pursue the tranquil and prosperous course which was marked out for it under the Treaty of Tientsin. That instrument vastly extended the area of diplomatic and commercial action in China. Access to the fountain head of Government was seemingly assured, the conditions of trade were fixed on a moderate basis, and, perhaps most important of all from the British standpoint, the opium difficulty which had been an obstacle to peaceful relations for generations was removed. So much, in fact, had been gained that there was little that was immediately practicable left to secure. But peace is a blessing which cannot be commanded, and it proved in this instance as in others that the British Government, though actuated by the most pacific of sentiments, was driven to assume once more an attitude of determined hostility towards the Chinese. The source of trouble was the familiar one in our relations with the Celestial Empire—bad faith in the execution of treaty pledges. And the rupture followed quickly on the heels of the conclusion of peace, arising in fact out of the ratification of the Tientsin Convention. Mr. Frederick Bruce, brother of Lord Elgin, who had acted as secretary to that nobleman during his embassy, had been entrusted with the duty of carrying the final formality through at Peking, and arrived at Hongkong in April for that purpose. His definite instructions were to exchange the ratifications nowhere but at the capital, but he quickly discovered that this was a counsel of perfection in the circumstances of the hour. The rumours which were brought with every fresh ship from the mainland were of military preparations, and of a determination to resist the indignity to the imperial person of a mission to Peking. Knowing he stood on firm ground Mr. Bruce did not waste any time in futile negotiations in the south. Having despatched a letter formally announcing his pending departure for Tientsin, and expressing a hope that adequate means would be provided for his conveyance to Peking and his accommodation there, he proceeded northwards. At Shanghai he found the imperial commissioners still there, and it was ominous that they manifested a disposition to discuss certain unsettled points of detail which they calmly assumed were still open to debate. Mr. Bruce was not to be drawn into any side issue by efforts however speciously framed. His mission was to get to Peking as quickly as possible and