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else."[1] On April 19, 2003, KSM was questioned for the first time about summer 2002 reporting from Masran bin Arshad, who was in the custody of a foreign government, regarding the "Second Wave" plot. Informed that bin Arshad had been detained, KSM stated, "I have forgotten about him, he is not in my mind at all."[2] In response, ALEC Station noted that it "remain[e]d concerned that KSM's progression towards full debriefing status is not yet apparent where it counts most, in relation to threats to US interests, especially inside CONUS."[3] In June 2003, almost three months after the CIA had stopped using its enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM, senior ALEC Station and RDG officers met at least twice to discuss concerns about KSM's lack of cooperation.[4] As an ALEC Station cable noted at the time, "KSM's pattern of behavior over the past three months, trying to control his environment, lying and then admitting things only when pressed that others have been caught and have likely admitted the plot, is a cause for concern."[5] In an email, one CIA officer noted that "what KSM's doing is fairly typical of other detainees... KSM, Khallad [bin Attash], and others are doing what makes sense in their situation – pretend cooperation."[6]
(TS// //NF) In the fall of 2003, after KSM's explanations about how to decrypt phone numbers related to British operative Issa al-Britani (KSM did not identify the operative as "Issa al-Hindi," or by his true name, Dhiren Barot) yielded no results, and after KSM misidentified another individual, known not to be Issa, as Issa, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station stated in an email that KSM was "obstructing our ability to acquire good information," noting that KSM "misidentifie[s] photos when he knows we are fishing" and "misleads us on telephone numbers."[7] Later, after KSM's transfer to DETENTION SITE BLACK, ALEC Station wrote that KSM "may never be fully forthcoming and honest" on the topic of UBL's whereabouts.[8] Despite repeated challenges, KSM maintained that he lacked information on UBL's location.[9]
- ↑ Memorandum for: ; ; ; from: ; subject: Action detainee branch; date: June 12, 2003 (emphasis in the original).
- ↑ 11319 (191445Z APR 03), disseminated as
- ↑ ALEC (222153Z APR 03)
- ↑ Email from: ; to: ; cc: , , [REDACTED], , , [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], , , , , , [REDACTED], , , [REDACTED]; subject: Khallad & KSM Detainee Case Discussion; date: June 18, 2003, at 10:09 AM; ALEC (302258Z JUN 03).
- ↑ ALEC (302258Z JUN 03)
- ↑ Email from: ; to: ; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], , , , , , , [REDACTED], , [REDACTED]; subject: Re: KSM's passive restraint – please let me know if you have comments for a memo to the DCI; date: June 24, 2003, at 1:27:06 PM.
- ↑ Email from: ; to: , , , , , , [REDACTED]; cc: ; subject: KSM and Khallad Issues; date: October 16, 2003, at 5:25:13 PM.
- ↑ ALEC (111932Z NOV 03)
- ↑ 10400 (161754Z NOV 03). KSM, who was with Ayman al-Zawahiri the day before his March 1, 2003, capture, first informed the CIA of this fact more than a month later, on April 3, 2003. See 11139 (051956Z APR 03).
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