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not be provided access to KSM until his anticipated transfer to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Neither the CIA nor the FBI knew at the time that the transfer would not occur until September 2006.[1]
(TS// //NF) Between April 2003 and July 2003, KSM frustrated the CIA on a number of fronts. On May 7, 2003, after more than two months of conflicting reporting, ALEC Station concluded that KSM "consistently wavers" on issues of UBL's location, protectors, and hosts, and that his information "conveniently lack[s] sufficient detail [to be] actionable intelligence."[2] On June 12, 2003, CIA Headquarters indicated that it "remain[ed] highly suspicious that KSM is withholding, exaggerating, misdirecting, or outright fabricating information on CBRN issues."[3] At the end of April 2003, KSM was shown pictures of the recently captured Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash, after which he provided additional information related to their plotting in Karachi.[4] ALEC Station wrote in a May 20, 2003, cable that "[w]e consider KSM's long-standing omission of [this] information to be a serious concern, especially as this omission may well have cost American lives had Pakistani authorities not been diligent in following up on unrelated criminal leads that led to the capture of Ammar, bin Attash, and other probable operatives involved in the attack plans."[5]
(TS// //NF) In May and June 2003, Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash provided reporting that contradicted KSM's statements about the Heathrow Airport plotting and included information that KSM had not provided.[6] After KSM was confronted with this reporting, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station wrote in an email, "OK, that's it... yet again he lies and ONLY ADMITS details when he knows we know them from someone
- ↑ Memorandum for: James L. Pavitt; ; Jose Rodriguez; ; ; from: ; subject: Update: Director Mueller - DCI Tenet Conversation on KSM; date: June 4, 2003, at 05:47:32 PM. Note for: James L. Pavitt; from: ; cc: , Jose Rodriguez, ; subject: Director Mueller Plans to Call DCI on KSM Issue; date: May 21, 2003, at 08:40:22 PM. In addition to the FBI, senior CIA officers, including CTC's representatives to the FBI, complained about the limitations on the dissemination of intelligence derived from CIA interrogations and the impact those limitations had on counterterrorism analysis. The CTC's representative to the FBI described this to the OIG as a "serious concern." He stated that the compartmentation of interrogation information resulted in delays in dissemination that could result in information being "missed." He also stated that the CIA's compartmentation of information prevented him from providing to the FBI "some insight into the value/credibility of intelligence reports." (See interview of , by , Office of the Inspector General, August 18, 2003.) Among the other CIA officers expressing these concerns were the deputy chief of CTC's Al-Qa'ida Department, who told the OIG that limited access to operational traffic "has had an impact on [analysts'] full knowledge of actiities, and thus their analysis." (See , Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorism Center Al-Qa'ida Department; July 28, 2003.) The Director of Analysis at CTC described analysts' limited access to information as a "continuing problem." (See August 18, 2003, Memorandum for the Record, meeting with Counterterrorism Center, Director of Analysis, Office of the Inspector General.) The CIA's Deputy Director of Intelligence told the OIG that limitations on the dissemination of operational information prevented the "full cadre of analysts" from reviewing the intelligence and that, as a result, "we're losing analytic ability to look at [foreign intelligence] in a timely manner." See interview of , by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, September 12, 2003.
- ↑ ALEC (072002Z MAY 03)
- ↑ DIRECTOR (121550Z JUN 03)
- ↑ 11454 (301710Z APR 03); 11448 (301141Z APR 03)
- ↑ ALEC (022012Z MAY 03). See information in this summary and Volume II on the "Karachi Plot" for additional information.
- ↑ See detainee reviews for Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash in Volume III for additional information on the reporting the detainees provided.
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