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made "strong remarks" to the CIA about how he and the secretary of state were "cut out of the NSC [National Security Council] clearance/coordination process" with regard to the CIA program. According to CIA records, Armitage also questioned the efficacy of the program and the value of the intelligence derived from the program.[1] While it is unclear how the ambassador's concerns were resolved, he later joined the chief of Station in making a presentation to Country 's on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The presentation talking points did not describe the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, but represented that "[w]ithout the full range of these interrogation measures, we would not have succeeded in overcoming the resistance of [Khalid Shaykh Muhammad] and other equally resistant HVDs." The talking points included many of the same inaccurate representations[2] made to U.S. policymakers and others, attributing to CIA detainees critical information on the "Karachi Plot," the "Heathrow Plot," the "Second Wave Plot," and the "Guraba Cell"; as well as intelligence related to Issa al-Hindi, Abu Talha al-Pakistani, Hambali, Jose Padilla, Binyam Mohammed, Sajid Badat, and Jaffar al-Tayyar. The presentation also noted that the president of the United States had directed that he not be informed of the locations of the CIA detention facilities to ensure he would not accidentally disclose the information.[3]
(TS// //NF) In a separate Country, Country , the CIA obtained the approval of the and the political leadership to establish a detention facility before informing the U.S. ambassador.[4] As the CIA chief of Station stated in his request to CIA Headquarters to brief the ambassador, Country 's and the probably would ask the ambassador about the CIA detention facility.[5] After delayed briefing the for months, to the consternation of the CIA Station, which wanted political approval prior to the arrival of CIA detainees.[6] The Country official outside of the aware of the facility, was described as "shocked," but nonetheless approved.[7]
(TS// //NF) By mid-2003 the CIA had concluded that its completed, but still unused "holding cell" in Country was insufficient, given the growing number of CIA detainees in the program and the CIA's interest in interrogating multiple detainees at the same detention site. The CIA thus sought to build a new, expanded detention facility in the country.[8] The CIA
- ↑ Lotus Notes message from Chief of Station to D/CTC, COPS; copied in: email from: ; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], , , ; subject: ADCI Talking Points for Call to DepSec Armitage; date: at 7:40:43 PM. The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "with regard to the Study's claims that the State Department was 'cut out' of information relating to the program, the record shows that the Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of State... were aware of the sites at the time they were operational." As detailed throughout the Committee Study, CIA records indicate the secretary of state was not informed of the CIA detention site locations. During meetings with the CIA in the summer of 2013, the Committee requested, but was not provided, documentary evidence to support the assertion in the CIA's June 2013 Response.
- ↑ See relevant sections of this summary and Volume II for additional details.
- ↑ HEADQUARTERS [REDACTED]
- ↑ [REDACTED] 64105
- ↑ [REDACTED] 30296
- ↑ See Volume I for additional details.
- ↑ [REDACTED] 4076 [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] 32266 [REDACTED]
- ↑ HEADQUARTERS
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