Page:US Senate Report on CIA Detention Interrogation Program.pdf/45

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am happy to say that… it is not in my memory typical of what my colleagues and I did in the agency during the time I was connected with it."[1]

(TS// //NF) Notwithstanding the Hart investigation findings, just five years later, in 1983, a CIA officer incorporated significant portions of the KUBARK manual into the Human Resource Exploitation (HRE) Training Manual, which the same officer used to provide interrogation training in Latin America in the early 1980s, and which was used to provide interrogation training to the   in 198 .[2] CIA officer   was involved in the HRE training and conducted interrogations. The CIA inspector general later recommended that he be orally admonished for inappropriate use of interrogation techniques.[3] In the fall of 2002,   became the CIA's chief of interrogations in the CIA's Renditions Group,[4] the officer in charge of CIA interrogations.[5]

(TS// //NF) Despite the CIA's previous statements that coercive physical and psychological interrogation techniques "result in false answers"[6] and have "proven to be ineffective,"[7] as well as the aforementioned early November 2001 determination that "[s]pecific methods of interrogation w[ould] be permissible so long as they generally comport with commonly accepted practices deemed lawful by U.S. courts,"[8] by the end of November 2001, CIA officers had begun researching potential legal defenses for using interrogation techniques that were considered torture by foreign governments and a non-governmental organization. On November 26, 2001, attorneys in the CIA's Office of General Counsel circulated a draft legal memorandum describing the criminal prohibition on torture and a potential "novel" legal defense for CIA officers who engaged in torture. The memorandum stated that the "CIA could argue that the torture was necessary to prevent imminent, significant, physical harm to persons, where there is no other available means to prevent the harm," adding that "states may be very unwilling to call the U.S. to task for torture when it resulted in saving thousands of lives."[9] An August 1,


  1. "Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy," Hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations of U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, Second Session, September 11-15, 1978. Testimony of John Hart, pp. 487-536 (September 15, 1978) (DTS #Q04761).
  2. Transcript of Committee Hearing on   Interrogation Manual, June 17, 1988,pp. 3-4 (DTS #1988-2302).
  3. April 13, 1989, Memorandum from CIA Inspector General William F. Donnelly to Jim Currie and John Nelson, SSCI Staff, re: Answers to SSCI Questions on  , attachment M to Memorandum to Chairman and Vice Chairman, re: Inquiry into   Interrogation Training, July 10, 1989 (DTS # 1989-0675). See also     1984, Memorandum for Inspector General from [REDACTED], Inspector, via Deputy Inspector General, re:  , IG- 84.
  4. As noted, the Renditions Group was also known during the program as the "Renditions and Interrogations Group," as well as the "Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group," and by the initials, "RDI" and "RDG."
  5. December 4, 2002, Training Report, Revised Version, High Value Target Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) Training Seminar 12-18 Nov 02 ("[ ] was recently assigned to the CTC/RG to manage the HVT Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) mission, assuming the role as HVT interrogator/Team Chief.").
  6. January 8, 1989, Letter from John L. Helgerson, Director of Congressional Affairs to Vice Chairman William S. Cohen, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence re: SSCI Questions on  , at 7-8 (DTS #1989-0131).
  7. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of Richard Stolz, Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (June 17, 1988), at 15 (DTS #1988-2302).
  8. November 7, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, "Handling Interrogation." See also Volume I.
  9. November 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, "Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for CIA Officers." The draft memo cited the "Israeli example" as a possible basis for arguing that "torture was necessary to prevent imminent, significant, physical harm to persons, where there is no other available means to prevent the harm."

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